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INTRODUCTION

Uniformity is frequently cited as the hallmark of any fair
system of justice, crucial to providing its rationality, predictability,
coherence, and legitimacy. 1 The legislature enacted the North
Carolina Administrative Procedure Act (APA) in 1973 with the
express purpose of establishing “a uniform system of administrative
rulemaking and adjudicatory procedure for agencies.”2 The system
extends to standards of judicial review, which are explicitly stated in
section 150B-51 of Article 4 of the APA. 3 Consistent with the
statutory goal of uniformity, the North Carolina Supreme Court has
ruled that section 150B-51 is the default standard of judicial review
for appeals of agency orders and decisions. 4 However, numerous
*Assistant Professor, Campbell Law School. With gratitude to everyone
who read drafts and commented on this project, especially Judge Julian Mann, III,
Bobbi Jo Boyd, Margaret Currin, Charles Daye, Lisa Lukasik, Matt Sawchak, and
Richard Whisnant, and for the research assistance of Emily Pappas, Chris Waivers
and Julie Yates.
1

See, e.g., Evan H. Caminker, Precedent and Prediction: The ForwardLooking Aspects of Inferior Court Decisionmaking, 73 TEX. L. REV. 1, 38–39
(1994) (discussing the benefits of uniform interpretation of federal substantive
laws); Erwin Chemerinsky & Barry Friedman, The Fragmentation of Federal
Rules, 46 MERCER L. REV. 757, 757 (1995) (praising the “triumph of uniformity”
in the adoption of the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure); Tom C. Clark, Attorney
General’s Manual on the Administrative Procedure Act, FSU COLLEGE OF LAW
(1947), http://www.law.fsu.edu/library/admin/1947intro.html (last visited May 31,
2013) (citing the imposition of “relative uniformity” on the federal administrative
machinery as one of the goals of the act); see also infra text accompanying notes
110–115.
2
N.C. GEN. STAT. § 150B-1 (2013). The APA was enacted in 1973 and
codified in Chapter 150A of the general statutes. In 1986, sections 150A-1 through
150A-64 were recodified as sections 150B-1 through 150B-64. Chapter 150A.
Administrative
Procedure
Act,
NCGA,
http://www.ncleg.net/gascripts/statutes/statutelookup.pl?statute=150A (last visited
Mar. 8, 2013).
3
N.C. GEN. STAT. §§ 150B-43 to -52. Unless otherwise indicated, all
statutes referenced in the text are from North Carolina.
4
Overton v. Goldsboro City Bd. of Educ., 283 S.E.2d 495, 498 (N.C.
1981) (applying the APA in the “interest of uniformity” to appeals from city and
county boards of education when no other statute specified a standard of review,
even though city and county boards were exempt from the APA); State ex rel.
Utils. Comm’n v. Bird Oil, 273 S.E.2d 232, 235 n.1 (N.C. 1980); State ex rel.
Comm’r of Ins. v. N.C. Rate Bureau, 269 S.E.2d 547, 559 (N.C. 1980). But see In
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agency-specific statutes undermine the APA’s goal of uniform
judicial review.5 This Article argues that the legislature should revise
such statutes, thereby standardizing, simplifying, and clarifying the
standard of judicial review of administrative appeals.
The APA envisions a system where most appeals 6 from an
order or decision of a North Carolina agency are filed in a North
Carolina Superior Court,7 invoking the appellate jurisdiction of the
court.8 Any deviation from this norm must be specifically mandated
by a statute that confers a standard of review at least “equal to” the
one provided by the APA. 9 Unfortunately, many statutes deviate
from that norm. There are at least seventeen agency-specific statutes
that confer original jurisdiction in the courts over administrative
appeals, meaning that the reviewing court has the plenary power to
retry the case. 10 There are also dozens of specific judicial review
provisions in agency organic statutes. While some of these statutes
clearly confer appellate jurisdiction on the reviewing courts, many of
them use inconsistent or unclear language. The resulting difficulty in
determining the correct standard of review can be confusing to judges
and litigants alike.11
Discovering the correct standard of review is further
complicated by the relative lack of guidance available to judges and
practitioners. Appeals from administrative orders comprise only a
re McElwee, 283 S.E.2d 115, 120 (N.C. 1981) (noting that agency-specific statute
provided the correct standard of review because it was enacted after the APA).
5
See Appendix.
6
Only a few administrative orders are appealable to courts other than the
superior courts. For example, the North Carolina Court of Appeals reviews the
final orders of the North Carolina Utilities and Industrial Commissions and certain
orders of the Commission of Insurance. N.C. GEN. STAT. §§ 7A-250(b), 58-2-80.
Appeals from the rulings of county game commissioners are reviewed de novo in
the district court division. Id. § 7A–250(c); see infra text accompanying notes
158–161.
7
In North Carolina, the general court of justice consists of an appellate
division, a superior court division, and a district court division. N.C. CONST. art.
IV, § 9 (2013); N.C. GEN. STAT. § 7A-4.
8
N.C. GEN. STAT. §§ 150B-43, 150B-51.
9
Comm’r of Ins. v. Rate Bureau, 269 S.E.2d 547, 559 (N.C. 1980); N.C.
GEN. STAT. § 150B-43.
10
See infra Part III.A. Original jurisdiction provides for a standard of
review that is greater in scope than appellate jurisdiction.
11
See infra Part III.B.
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fraction of the superior court docket. From July 2011 to June 2012,
for example, administrative appeals comprised less than 1% of the
civil docket in the superior courts, and .1% of the total docket. 12
Perhaps because of the low percentage of appeals from
administrative cases, scholarly articles and written opinions on the
standard of review are comparatively sparse. Furthermore, it is
difficult for a superior court judge, who is subject to reelection after
an eight-year term, 13 to develop expertise in this area if he rarely
handles administrative appeals. 14
To make matters more
complicated, the legislature in 2011 tinkered with the review
provisions in the APA, changing the standard of review of decisions
made by the administrative law judges (ALJs) in the Office of
Administrative Hearings (OAH).15
This Article has two purposes, one descriptive and one
normative. The descriptive task is to provide an overview of the
standards of judicial review in North Carolina, including recent
legislative updates, to assist superior court judges and practitioners in
understanding these standards.16 There is some urgency in educating
12

See N.C. ADMIN. OFFICE OF THE COURTS, NORTH CAROLINA COURTS,
STATISTICAL AND OPERATIONAL REPORT: TRIAL COURTS 3 (July 1, 2011–June 30,
2012),
available
at
http://www.nccourts.org/Citizens/SRPlanning/Documents/2011-12_SORTrialCourts.pdf (reporting that only 130 administrative appeals were filed in 201112, of the 24,345 civil cases and 290,121 total cases filed).
13
N.C. CONST. art. IV, § 16 (2013).
14
Prior to 1985 the APA vested jurisdiction over administrative appeals
exclusively in the Wake County Superior Court. An Act to Amend Chapter 150A
of the General Statutes, ch. 746, 1985 N.C. Sess. Laws 1006. The judges in Wake
County developed a familiarity with administrative cases.
Currently,
administrative appeals must be made to the superior court in the county where the
petitioner resides, thereby dispersing the administrative caseload and making it
even more difficult for superior court judges to develop expertise in the area. N.C.
GEN. STAT. § 150B-45(a)(2) (2013).
15
See infra Part II.C.2.
16
The genesis of this Article was a paper presented by the Honorable Paul
Ridgeway, a superior court judge in Wake County, to the North Carolina
Conference of Superior Court Judges. Judge Ridgeway’s presentation was
intended to educate superior court judges, many of whom have little or no
experience with administrative cases before they are elected to the bench, in the
complexities of reviewing such appeals. Paul Ridgeway, Remarks at the North
Carolina Conference of Superior Court Judges (Oct. 19, 2011) (transcript available
at the University of North Carolina School of Government), available at
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the North Carolina bench and bar in this area. Now that ALJs can
enter final orders in contested cases, agencies have the right to appeal
unfavorable decisions to the superior court, 17 which may cause a
significant increase in the number of cases brought to the courts and a
corresponding need for a clear and predictable regime of judicial
review. As long ago as 1980, the North Carolina Supreme Court
noted that “[t]he proliferation of appeals from state administrative
agencies during recent years requires an orderly appellate process,”
which necessarily entails identifying and applying the appropriate
standard of review. 18 Orderly process disappears when one court
must “guess the scope of review provided by another and when the
parties fail to structure their arguments on appeal according to the
relevant standard.”19 The normative purpose of this Article is to urge
the North Carolina General Assembly to make changes that will
facilitate the orderly appellate process envisioned by the APA and
desired by the supreme court.
Part II of this Article surveys and summarizes the current
landscape of appellate and original jurisdiction over administrative
appeals in the superior courts, including recent legislative updates,
with the intention of providing a useful guide to judges and
practitioners alike. Part III of this Article proposes legislative
updates to simplify and clarify superior court jurisdiction over
http://www.sog.unc.edu/sites/www.sog.unc.edu/files/Ridgeway_SCJ%20Conf%20
manuscript%20formatted.pdf.
17
N.C. GEN. STAT. § 150B-34 (giving ALJs authority to make final
decisions in contested cases); N.C. GEN. STAT. § 150B-43 (providing right to
judicial review for “[a]ny party or person aggrieved by the final decision in a
contested case”); N.C. GEN. STAT. § 150B-2(5) (including agency in the definition
of party).
18
State ex rel. Utils. Comm’n v. Bird Oil Co., 273 S.E.2d 232, 235 (N.C.
1980).
19
Id.; see also In re N.C. Sav. & Loan League, 276 S.E.2d 404, 409 (N.C.
1981) (noting that “use of the correct standard clarifies the basic issues and focuses
the reviewing court’s inquiry on the relevant factors”). Nevertheless, the North
Carolina Supreme Court has occasionally reviewed cases in which neither of the
lower courts identified the standard of review they applied, or applied an
inappropriate standard of review. See, e.g., Brooks v. McWhirter Grading Co., 281
S.E.2d 24, 27–28 (N.C. 1981); N.C. Sav. & Loan League, 276 S.E.2d at 409; Bird
Oil Co., 273 S.E.2d at 235. The reviewing court’s application of an incorrect
standard of review may, but does not necessarily, result in a remand. See, e.g.,
Meza v. Div. of Soc. Servs., 692 S.E.2d 96, 104 (N.C. 2010).
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administrative appeals. First, the legislature should amend almost all
of the statutes that confer original jurisdiction on the reviewing
courts, conferring appellate jurisdiction instead.
Second, the
legislature should consider amending the current array of agencyspecific judicial review statutes to use language that more clearly and
simply confers APA-style appellate jurisdiction on the reviewing
court.
II.

THE CURRENT STATE OF SUPERIOR COURT JURISDICTION OVER
ADMINISTRATIVE APPEALS

There are three concepts important to understanding a
superior court’s jurisdiction over administrative appeals: first, the
difference between the appellate and original jurisdictions of the
superior courts; second, the standards of review conferred by the
APA, which govern the majority of all appeals from administrative
decisions; and third, the exceptions to the APA’s default standards of
review, whether minor or significant. This section discusses each
topic in turn.
A.

The Appellate and Original Jurisdiction of the North
Carolina Superior Courts

The superior court’s authority to hear appeals from
administrative agencies is conferred by section 7A-250(a) of the
General Statutes, which establishes two distinct types of jurisdiction:
“review by original action or proceeding, or by appeal.” 20 It is
critical for the superior court to understand whether the case invokes
its original or appellate jurisdiction, as the different types of
jurisdiction result in different scopes of review.
The superior court exercises its appellate jurisdiction over
administrative orders in much the same way that a court of appeals
exercises appellate jurisdiction over superior court orders. The scope
of appellate jurisdiction is to examine the lower tribunal’s decision
and determine “whether the findings of fact are supported by the
evidence, whether the findings support the conclusions of law, and
whether the conclusions of law are a proper statement and application

20

N.C. GEN. STAT. § 7A-250(a) (emphasis added).
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of the law.” 21 The superior court reviews de novo the lower
tribunal’s decision for errors of law but defers to the lower tribunal’s
findings of fact, provided that they are “supported by competent
evidence.”22 When exercising its appellate jurisdiction, the superior
court may not hear new evidence and does not retry the facts.23
By contrast, the superior court exercises its original
jurisdiction over administrative orders by essentially conducting a
new trial on both the facts and the law in the case.24 In this scenario,
the court is empowered to “disregard the facts found in an earlier
hearing or trial and engage in independent fact-finding.”25 To invoke
the superior court’s original jurisdiction over an appeal from an
administrative decision, a statute must specifically use language that
directs the superior court to take new evidence or examine evidence
anew. 26 The power to engage in independent fact-finding is the
hallmark of original jurisdiction; when the superior court exercises its
original jurisdiction, it must make its own findings of fact and cannot
defer this task to the agency.27
21

Meza, 692 S.E.2d at 103 n.1.
N.C. Dep’t of Env’t & Natural Res. v. Carroll, 599 S.E.2d 888, 896
(N.C. 2004) (noting that it is the “traditional function of appellate courts to review
the decisions of lower tribunals for errors of law or procedure, . . . while generally
deferring to the latter's ‘unchallenged superiority’ to act as finders of fact,” and if
those facts “are supported by competent evidence, the trial court’s findings of fact
are conclusive on appeal.” (citations omitted)).
23
See Meza, 692 S.E.2d at 103 (finding that superior court erroneously
made de novo findings of fact while conducting a review bound by the provisions
of the APA). If a petitioner wishes to present additional evidence, and “the court is
satisfied that the evidence is material to the issues, is not merely cumulative, and
could not reasonably have been presented at the administrative hearing,” the
superior court may remand the case to the lower tribunal “so that additional
evidence can be taken.” N.C. GEN. STAT. § 150B-49.
24
Even when a statute confers original jurisdiction in the superior court,
the parties must still exhaust their administrative remedies. N.C. GEN. STAT. 150B43 (conferring the right to judicial review on parties who have “exhausted all
administrative remedies” and are “aggrieved by the final decision in a contested
case”); see also In re N.C. Pesticide Bd., File Nos. IR94–128, IR94–151, IR94–
155, 509 S.E.2d 165, 174 (N.C. 1998).
25
Carroll, 599 S.E.2d at 895 n.3 (citation omitted).
26
See In re Dunn, 326 S.E.2d 309, 311–12 (N.C. Ct. App. 1985) (finding
that statute did not confer power on superior court to find new facts in appeal from
tax assessment).
27
Carroll, 599 S.E.2d at 896.
22
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Because the standards of review in the APA are established as
the default, appeals from agency orders to the superior court invoke
its appellate jurisdiction, and not its original jurisdiction, unless a
statute specifically provides otherwise.28 Most appeals from agencies
to the superior court fall within the APA’s default rule, and therefore
invoke only the court’s appellate jurisdiction. However, because
some statutes designate certain agency appeals to be within the
superior court’s original jurisdiction, the superior court must always
determine, by reference to statute, the scope of its jurisdiction, as
described in the following sections.
B.

The Default Rule: Appellate Jurisdiction as Determined by
the APA

In most instances of appeals from agency decisions, the
jurisdiction of the superior court is determined by Article 4 of the
APA. Within Article 4, section 150B-43 provides, in part, that:
Any . . . person who is aggrieved by the final
decision in a contested case,29 and who has exhausted
all administrative remedies made available to [him] by
statute or agency rule, is entitled to judicial review of
the decision under this Article, unless adequate
procedure for judicial review is provided by another
statute, in which case the review shall be under such
other statute.30
While the statute specifically refers to decisions in contested
cases, the standards of review in Article 4 also apply to agency rules
when the agency has either denied or ruled on a request for a
28

N.C. GEN. STAT. § 150B-43; Dunn, 326 S.E.2d at 311; see infra Part

II.B.
29

A contested case includes “any dispute between an agency and another
person that involves the person’s rights, duties, or privileges, including licensing or
the levy of a monetary penalty.” N.C. GEN. STAT. § 150B-22. The APA
encourages all such disputes to be decided first through “informal” procedures. Id.
If those proceedings fail to reach a resolution, either party may “commence an
administrative proceeding,” at which time the dispute becomes a “contested case.”
Id.
30
N.C. GEN. STAT. § 150B-43 (emphasis added).
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declaratory ruling pursuant to section 150B-4 31 or has denied a
petition for rulemaking pursuant to section 150B-20.32
Accordingly, Article 4 of the APA, which confers appellate
jurisdiction only, is the default authority for the superior court’s
jurisdiction in agency appeals. The superior court’s jurisdiction over
agency appeals is appellate unless the agency (1) is exempt from
Article 4 of the APA, (2) is governed by a statute that specifies a
different standard of review, or (3) is subject to the unique exception
within Article 4.33 The next section describes in detail the appellate
jurisdiction authorized by the APA and then briefly outlines the three
exceptions to the default rule.
1.

The Standard of Review Under the Superior Court’s
Appellate Jurisdiction

When a superior court has jurisdiction over an agency
decision pursuant to Article 4 of the APA, the statute authorizes two
types of review, depending on the errors alleged by the petitioner34: a
de novo standard of review regarding questions of law, and “whole
record” review regarding “fact-intensive” questions.35 Whole record
review is deferential to the agency, whereas de novo review is not.
While the APA designates only two standards of review—one
for questions of law and one for questions of fact—some questions
31

N.C. GEN. STAT. § 150B-4(a)(a1) (allowing judicial review if the
request for a declaratory ruling is denied, has been issued, has not been denied or
granted within thirty days, or has not issued within forty-five days); Diggs v. N.C.
Dep’t of Health & Human Servs., 578 S.E.2d 666, 669 (N.C. Ct. App. 2003)
(listing elements requiring agency to issue declaratory ruling).
32
N.C. GEN. STAT. § 150B-20(d) (“Denial of a rule-making petition . . . is
subject to judicial review . . . . Failure . . . to grant or deny a rule-making petition
within the agency’s time limit . . . [functions as] a denial” and is subject to judicial
review.); see, e.g., ACT-UP Triangle v. Comm’n for Health Servs., 483 S.E.2d
388, 391 (N.C. 1997) (finding that Commission had denied ACT-UP’s petition to
amend its rule).
33
See N.C. Dep’t of Env’t & Natural Res. v. Carroll, 599 S.E.2d 888,
896–97 (N.C. 2004).
34
ACT-UP Triangle, 483 S.E.2d at 392.
35
N.C. GEN. STAT. § 150B-51(c); Meza v. Div. of Soc. Servs., 692 S.E.2d
96, 102 (N.C. 2010); N.C. Dep’t of Env’t & Natural Res. v. Carroll, 599 S.E.2d
888, 894 (N.C. 2004); Charles E. Daye, Powers of Administrative Law Judges,
Agencies, and Courts: An Analytical and Empirical Perspective, 79 N.C. L. REV.
1571, 1592 (2001).
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are difficult to sort neatly into the categories of “law” or “fact.” Such
issues, which are sometimes called “mixed question of law and fact,”
often involve the application of a broad or ambiguous statutory term
to the facts in a particular case; 36 typical examples include the
definitions of “negligence” or whether an injury “arises out of and in
the course of the employment.”37 In such cases, the correct standard
of review—deferential or not—can be determined according to
functional considerations, such as the types of facts at issue, the
expertise of the agency making the initial decision, and whether the
reviewing judge believes that she is equally well situated as the
agency to decide the matter. 38 Thus, for example, if the statutory
term to be applied is specifically defined by statute, the reviewing
court is equally well situated as the agency to interpret the term.39
But if the issues turn on the credibility of witnesses, or rely on

36

NLRB v. Hearst, 322 U.S. 111, 131 (1944) (prescribing “limited”
judicial review when “the question is one of specific application of a broad
statutory term in a proceeding in which the agency administering the statute must
determine it initially ”).
37
Bolkhir v. N.C. State Univ., 365 S.E.2d 898, 900 (N.C. 1988)
(“Negligence is a mixed question of law and fact, and the reviewing court must
determine whether the Commission’s findings support its conclusions.”); Ramsey
v. S. Indus. Constructors Inc., 630 S.E.2d 681, 685 (N.C. Ct. App. 2006) (“The
Commission’s determination that an accident arose out of and in the course of
employment is a mixed question of law and fact . . . . This Court reviews the
record to determine if the findings of fact and conclusions of law are supported by
the record.”). Both of these mixed questions are decided in the first instance by the
Industrial Commission and appealed directly to the Court of Appeals, where they
are reviewed for “any competent evidence.” Id. at 685. Now that the Industrial
Commission is subject to the APA, this standard of review may change. See also
Daye, supra note 35, at 1593 n.82; infra text accompanying notes 75–78.
38
For an in-depth discussion, see HARRY T. EDWARDS & LINDA A.
ELLIOTT, FEDERAL COURTS STANDARDS OF REVIEW 12–16 (2007) (discussing the
standard of review for mixed questions of law and fact); Daye, supra note 35, at
1592–94.
39
See, e.g., Brooks v. McWhirter Grading Co., 281 S.E.2d 24, 27–28
(N.C. 1981) (holding that de novo review applied to the Board’s interpretation of
the statutory term “serious,” which is specifically defined in N.C. GEN. STAT. § 95127(18)); In re N.C. Sav. & Loan League, 276 S.E.2d 404, 409 (N.C. 1981)
(holding that de novo, not whole record, review applied to the Credit Union’s
interpretation of the statutory term “common bond,” which is specifically defined
in N.C. GEN. STAT. § 54-109.26(b)).
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specialized or technical expertise, the reviewing court should use
deferential (whole record) review.40
The next two sections will discuss, in turn, the de novo and
whole record standards of review.
2.

The De Novo Standard of Review

When employing the de novo standard of review, a superior
court acts in the capacity of an appellate court and reviews the
official record of an agency decision for errors of law.41 The superior
court “consider[s] the matter anew[] and freely substitut[es] its own
judgment for the agency’s judgment.”42 The court should treat the
matter “as though the issue had not yet been determined.” 43 The
court may reverse or modify the agency’s decision if it finds that
“substantial rights of the petitioners may have been prejudiced.”44

40

State ex rel. Comm’r of Ins. v. N.C. Rate Bureau, 269 S.E.2d 547, 565
(N.C. 1980) (noting that, in an adjudicatory proceeding, it is for the agency, not the
court, “to determine the weight and sufficiency of the evidence and the credibility
of the witnesses, to draw inferences from the facts, and to appraise conflicting and
circumstantial evidence.”); Daye, supra note 35, at 1592–94; see, e.g., Hearst, 322
U.S. at 130 (applying deferential review to the agency’s decision that newsboys
were statutory employees because Congress had assigned the task of defining the
term to the agency in charge of administering the statute).
41
N.C. Dep’t of Env’t & Natural Res. v. Carroll, 599 S.E.2d 888, 895
(N.C. 2004). The de novo standard of appellate review should not be confused
with jurisdictional statutes that confer original jurisdiction on the superior court to
conduct a “‘de novo’ hearing or trial.” Id. at 896 n.3. These jurisdictional statutes
empower the court to consider anew the entire matter—both law and facts—as if
there had been no proceeding below. Id.; see infra Part III.B.
42
Mann Media, Inc. v. Randolph Cnty. Planning Bd., 565 S.E.2d. 9, 17
(N.C. 2002) (quotation marks omitted).
43
Whiteco Outdoor Adver. v. Johnson Cnty. Bd. of Adjustment, 513
S.E.2d 70, 74 (N.C. Ct. App. 1999).
44
N.C. GEN. STAT. §150B-51 (2013). The use of the phrase “may have
been prejudiced” requires a harmless error analysis. Daye, supra note 35, at 1592;
see, e.g., Bulloch v. N.C. Dep’t of Crime Control & Pub. Safety, 732 S.E.2d 373,
381–82 (N.C. Ct. App. 2012) (concluding that errors made by the State Personnel
Commission did not prejudice the Department of Crime Control and Public Safety
and affirming the Commission’s reversal of the Department’s termination of
officer).
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The APA identifies four issues of law that can be the basis of
a petitioner’s appeal45 and therefore reviewed de novo:
x Whether the agency’s decision was in violation of the
constitution,
x Whether the decision was in excess of statutory authority
or jurisdiction,
x Whether the decision was made upon unlawful procedure,
and
x Whether the decision was affected by other error of law.46
But not all errors of law receive de novo review, despite the
APA’s clear prescription. The courts traditionally defer, to a limited
extent, to an agency’s interpretation of an ambiguous provision of its
enabling statute or a statute that it has the authority to enforce.47 The
rationale for limited deference is based on the doctrine of separation
of powers, which is explicitly mandated by section 6 of article I of
the North Carolina Constitution.48 This doctrine requires the courts
to defer to the authority of an agency authorized to exercise
regulatory power, provided the delegation of that authority is
constitutional. 49 The theory of deferential judicial review is that
many agency actions, including some kinds of statutory construction,
45

In judicial appeals subject to Article 4 of the APA, the petitioner can
assert the six errors listed in section 150B-51(b): these four issues of law and the
two fact-intensive issues discussed in Part II.B.2–II.B.3 of this Article. Petitioners
are not limited to these assertions of error, however, as section 150B-43 also
provides that “[n]othing in this Chapter shall prevent any . . . person aggrieved
from invoking any judicial remedy available to [him] under the law to test the
validity of any administrative action not made reviewable under this Article.”
46
N.C. GEN. STAT. § 150B-51(b).
47
In re N.C. Sav. & Loan League, 276 S.E.2d 404, 410 (N.C. 1981).
48
N.C. CONST. art. I, § 6 (“The legislative, executive, and supreme
judicial powers of the State government shall be forever separate and distinct from
each other.”).
49
Jones v. Keller, 698 S.E.2d 49, 54 (N.C. 2010); State ex rel. Comm’r of
Ins. v. N.C. Rate Bureau, 269 S.E.2d 547, 563 (N.C. 1980) (noting that “we must
expect the Legislature to legislate only so far as is reasonable and practical to do
and we must leave to executive officers the authority to accomplish the legislative
purpose, guided of course by proper standards”); Adams v. N.C. Dep’t of Natural
& Econ. Res., 249 S.E.2d 402, 406 (N.C. 1978), (noting that “[a] modern
legislature must be able to delegate in proper instances ‘a limited portion of its
legislative powers’ to administrative bodies which are equipped to adapt legislation
‘to complex conditions involving numerous details with which the Legislature
cannot deal directly.’”).
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require expertise that the courts do not possess, and further, involve
policy choices more appropriately made by the politically
accountable branches of the government.50
Compared to the federal courts, North Carolina engages in a
more limited form of deference.
For example, despite its
51
longstanding tradition of deference, North Carolina has never
adopted the highly deferential standard of Chevron U.S.A., Inc. v.
Natural Resources Defense Council, Inc.52 Instead, in In re North
Carolina Savings & Loan League, the North Carolina Supreme Court
explicitly relied on an older federal case, Skidmore v. Swift & Co.,53
to describe the moderate degree to which it defers to an agency’s
interpretation of an ambiguous statutory term.54 Under Skidmore, a
reviewing court accepts an agency’s interpretation of a statutory term

50

See Gill v. Bd. of Comm’rs of Wake Cnty., 76 S.E. 203, 208 (N.C.
1912) (opining that “[i]f any such radical change in our governmental policy is to
be made, it should originate in the Legislature, acting within its legislative sphere,
and not in this court. It is inconceivable that a consistent and persistent
construction given to similar statutes by the superintendent of public instruction
and his legal adviser, the Attorney General, for so long a time, should have escaped
the attention of the Legislature, and its silence may safely be construed as an assent
to their interpretation of the word.”). But see City of Arlington v. FCC, 133 S. Ct.
1863 (2013) (Roberts, C.J., dissenting) (questioning whether the federal executive
agencies are politically accountable).
51
See Gill, 76 S.E. at 208 (deferring to the Superintendent of Public
Instruction’s interpretation of a statutory term, noting that “contemporaneous
construction and official usage for a long period by persons charged with the
administration of the law have always been regarded as legitimate and valuable
aids in ascertaining the meaning of a statute”).
52
Chevron, U.S.A., Inc. v. Natural Res. Defense Council, Inc., 467 U.S.
837 (1984). Under Chevron, a reviewing court will not disturb the agency’s
interpretation of an ambiguous statute unless it is “arbitrary, capricious, or
manifestly contrary to the statute.” Id. at 844. While Chevron has been cited in
several North Carolina Court of Appeals opinions, the North Carolina Supreme
Court has never adopted the Chevron approach. See, e.g., Charlotte-Mecklenburg
Hosp. Auth. v. N.C. Dep’t of Health & Human Servs., 685 S.E.2d 562, 565 (N.C.
Ct. App. 2009); Martin v. N.C. Dep’t of Health & Human Servs., 670 S.E.2d
629,632 (N.C. Ct. App. 2009); Comm’r of Labor of N.C. v. Weekley Homes, L.P.,
609 S.E.2d 407, 412 (N.C. Ct. App. 2005); Teasley v. Beck, 574 S.E.2d 137, 141
(N.C. Ct. App. 2002); Cnty. of Durham v. N.C. Dep’t of Env’t & Natural Res., 507
S.E.2d 310, 311 (N.C. Ct. App. 1998).
53
323 U.S. 134 (1944).
54
In re N.C. Sav. & Loan League, 276 S.E.2d 404, 410 (N.C. 1981).
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only if the court is persuaded that the interpretation is valid.55 While
the North Carolina Supreme Court acknowledged that courts
“traditionally accord[] some deference” to an agency’s interpretations
of its enabling statutes, it unequivocally stated that “those
interpretations are not binding.” 56 Rather, the weight given to the
agency interpretation depends on “the thoroughness evident in its
consideration, the validity of its reasoning, its consistency with
earlier and later pronouncements, and all those factors which give it
power to persuade, if lacking power to control.”57 If the court finds
the agency’s interpretation unpersuasive, it has the authority to
substitute a meaning closer to that intended by the legislature.58
The style of deference articulated by Skidmore and In re
Appeal of North Carolina Savings & Loan League is perhaps better
described as another tool of statutory construction rather than
deference. When a statute is unambiguous, the reviewing court gives
the term its unambiguous meaning, giving no deference to the
agency. 59
But when a statutory term is ambiguous, “the
interpretation of a statute given by the agency charged with carrying
it out is entitled to great weight.”60 The agency’s interpretation joins
other statutory tools—such as “the language of the act, the spirit of

55

Skidmore, 323 U.S. at 140. Skidmore prescribes a much less deferential
approach to agency interpretations than that described in Chevron. EDWARDS &
ELLIOTT, supra note 38, at 160–61 (2007) (noting that Skidmore is less deferential
than the analysis under Chevron Step Two); Peter L. Strauss, “Deference” is Too
Confusing—Let’s Call Them “Chevron Space” and “Skidmore Weight”, 112
Colum. L. Rev. 1143, 1150-53 (2012) (describing the difference between Chevron
and Skidmore deference using the metaphors of “space” and “weight”).
56
N.C. Sav. & Loan League, 276 S.E.2d at 410 (finding unpersuasive the
North Carolina Credit Union Commission’s interpretation of the statutory term
“common bond”); see also Brooks v. McWhirter Grading Co., 281 S.E.2d 24, 29
(N.C. 1981) (considering whether the Board’s interpretation of the statutory term
“serious” is persuasive).
57
N.C. Sav. & Loan League, 276 S.E.2d at 410 (quoting Skidmore, 323
U.S. at 140).
58
Faizan v. Grain Dealers Mut. Ins. Co., 118 S.E.2d 303, 310 (N.C. 1961).
59
See, e.g., Walker v. Bd. of Trs., 499 S.E.2d 429, 430–31 (N.C. 1998)
(concluding that statutory term was unambiguous).
60
Frye Reg’l Med. Ctr., Inc. v. Hunt, 510 S.E.2d 159, 163 (N.C. 1999)
(concluding that statute was ambiguous and concurring with the Department of
Human Resources’s interpretation of the statutory term).
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the act and what the act seeks to accomplish” 61—in helping the court
to determine legislative intent.
If the standards of review in the APA could be described as a
spectrum of deference, de novo review would occupy a position at
one end, representing a complete lack of deference to the agency’s
position; Skidmore and In re Appeal of North Carolina Savings &
Loan League would occupy a position somewhat removed from that
end, but not as deferential as whole record review, which is discussed
in the next section.
3.

The Whole Record Standard of Review

When employing the whole record standard of review, a
superior court acts in the capacity of an appellate court and
deferentially reviews the official record of an agency decision for
error. The APA identifies two fact-intensive issues that require
deferential, whole record review:
x Whether the agency decision was supported by substantial
evidence, and
x Whether the agency decision was arbitrary, capricious, or
an abuse of discretion.62
The following subsections discuss each of these assertions of
error in turn.
a.

Not Supported by Substantial Evidence

If a party asserts that an agency decision is not supported by
substantial evidence, the superior court must conduct a “whole record
review,” 63 which means an examination of all of the competent
61

Lee v. Gore, 717 S.E.2d 356, 358 (N.C. 2011) (describing the traditional
tools of statutory construction).
62
N.C. GEN. STAT. § 150B-51(b)–(c) (2013). The “abuse of discretion”
language was added to the statute in 2001. Prior to that time, North Carolina courts
had used the phrases “abuse of discretion” and “arbitrary and capricious”
interchangeably. See Welch v. Kearns, 134 S.E.2d 155, 156 (N.C. 1964) (defining
review for abuse of discretion as review for evidence of “conscientious judgment,
not arbitrary action” on the part of the decisionmaker); High Rock Lake Ass’n v.
N.C. Envtl. Mgmt. Comm’n, 276 S.E.2d 472, 474 (N.C. Ct. App. 1981)
(concluding that omission of “abuse of discretion” from the APA did not preclude
judicial review of discretionary agency decisions).
63
N.C. GEN. STAT. § 150B–51(c).

Fall 2013

Simplifying the Standard of Review

601

evidence in the record to determine whether the agency decision is
supported by substantial evidence,64 and if not, whether substantial
rights of the petitioner may have been prejudiced because the
agency’s findings, inferences, conclusions, or decisions were affected
by the lack of substantial evidence.65 The whole record requirement
specifically means that the reviewing court must take into account
“whatever in the record fairly detracts from the weight of the
[agency’s] evidence” when determining the substantiality of evidence
supporting the agency’s decision.66 In other words, as described by
the U.S. Supreme Court in Universal Camera Corp. v. National
Labor Relations Board, whole record review requires the superior
court to take into account all of the evidence in the record, including
that which supports and detracts from the agency’s findings. 67
Whole record review is deferential and presumes that agencies, not
courts, are the superior fact-finders in administrative proceedings.68
Like the federal courts, the North Carolina courts define
substantial evidence as “such relevant evidence as a reasonable mind
might accept as adequate to support a conclusion.” 69 In terms of
quantity and quality of evidence, substantial evidence is more than a
mere scintilla, or more than a permissible factual inference that

64

N.C. Pesticide Bd. v. N.C. Dep’t of Agric., 509 S.E.2d 165, 170 (N.C.

1998).
65

N.C. GEN. STAT. § 150B-51(b)–(c).
Lackey v. N.C. Dep’t of Human Res., 293 S.E.2d 171 (N.C. 1982);
Thompson v. Wake Cnty. Bd. of Educ., 233 S.E.2d 538, 541 (N.C. 1977).
67
Universal Camera Corp. v. NLRB, 340 U.S. 474 (1951). The North
Carolina Supreme Court has explicitly adopted the reasoning of Universal Camera.
See Thompson, 233 S.E.2d at 541 (quoting and citing Universal Camera for the
meaning of the whole record test).
68
See generally KEITH WERHAN, PRINCIPLES OF ADMINISTRATIVE LAW
319–20 (2008).
69
See Consol. Edison Co. v. NLRB, 305 U.S. 197, 229 (1938) (defining
substantial evidence as “such relevant evidence as a reasonable mind might accept
as adequate to support a conclusion”); N.C. Pesticide Bd., 509 S.E.2d at 170;
Walker v. N.C. Dep’t of Human Res., 397 S.E.2d 350, 354 (N.C. Ct. App. 1990);
see also N.C. GEN. STAT. § 150B-51(b)(5); State ex rel. Utils. Comm’n v. Carolina
Util. Customers Ass’n, 524 S.E.2d 10 (N.C. 2000) (quoting Consol. Edison, to
define “substantial evidence” in the Public Utilities Act); N.C. Dep’t of Crime
Control & Pub. Safety v. Greene, 616 S.E.2d 594, 598 (N.C. Ct. App. 2005).
66
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supports the agency’s action. 70 Defined in this manner, the
substantial evidence standard is similar to the standard of review of a
directed verdict. The reviewing court must determine whether there
is enough evidence supporting the agency’s decision to refuse to
direct a verdict against the agency, were it a question of fact to be
tried to a jury.71
The substantial evidence test, unlike de novo review, is
strongly deferential to the agency. The agency’s findings of fact, if
supported by substantial evidence, “are conclusive on appeal.”72 The
reviewing court may not replace the agency’s judgment with its own
“as between two reasonably conflicting views, even though the court
could justifiably have reached a different result had the matter been
before it de novo.”73 In other words, the reviewing court must defer
to the agency’s findings regarding credibility of witnesses and the
resolution of conflicts in their testimonies.74
But the substantial evidence test is a more rigorous form of
review than the “any competent evidence” standard, which the North
Carolina courts used prior to the enactment of the APA.75 The “any
competent evidence” standard is so deferential to agency fact finders
that it requires the reviewing court to uphold the agency’s findings if
there is even one item of competent evidence to support its findings,
regardless of contradictory evidence in the record.76 The practical
70

See Lackey, 293 S.E.2d at 171; Thompson, 233 S.E.2d at 541. For a
detailed discussion of the quantity and quality of evidence in an agency record, see
Daye, supra note 35, at 1601–06.
71
See In re Will of Buck, 516 S.E.2d 858, 860 (N.C. 1999) (explaining
that appellate review of “a trial court’s rulings on motions for a directed verdict at
the close of the evidence . . . [tests] whether substantial evidence introduced at trial
would support a verdict in favor of the nonmoving party”); see also NLRB v.
Columbian Enameling & Stamping Co., 306 U.S. 292 (1939); WERHAN, supra note
68, at 320.
72
In re Wake Kidney Clinic P.A., 355 S.E.2d 788, 791 (N.C. Ct. App.
1987).
73
Meza v. Div. of Soc. Servs., 692 S.E.2d 96, 102, 105 (N.C. 2010)
(quoting Thompson, 233 S.E.2d at 541).
74
State ex rel. Comm’r of Ins. v. N.C. Rate Bureau, 269 S.E.2d 547, 565
(N.C. 1980); In re Wilkins, 242 S.E.2d 829, 841 (N.C. 1978).
75
In re Rogers, 253 S.E.2d 912, 922 (N.C. 1979).
76
See Frank W. Hanft, Administrative Law, 45 N.C. L. Rev. 816, 817
(1967) (describing the “any competent evidence” standard, quoting one judge as
saying “if one discredited witness said the cat was black, and 10 unimpeached
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effect of the “any competent evidence” standard is that the agency’s
findings of fact are conclusive and binding, and rarely, if ever,
overturned by the reviewing court. 77 In contrast, while it is a
deferential standard, there are many examples of a reviewing court
overturning an agency’s order using whole record review.78
Since the passage of the APA, the substantial evidence test
and whole record review have almost completely replaced the “any
competent evidence” test and are favored by the North Carolina
Supreme Court in the absence of a clear statutory directive to the
contrary. 79 However, the “any competent evidence” standard is
specified by statute for the decisions of the Board of Medical
Examiners, 80 the Industrial Commission, 81 and the Division of
witnesses declared it to be white, there was substantial evidence to support a
finding by the agency that the cat was black”).
77
Petree v. Duke Power Co., 150 S.E.2d 749, 750 (N.C. 1966) (applying
N.C. GEN. STAT. § 97-86 (2013), the standard of review mandated by statute for the
Industrial Commission).
78
See, e.g., Lackey v. N.C. Dep’t of Human Res., 293 S.E.2d 171, 178
(N.C. 1982) (overturning judgment for the Department of Human Resources,
finding that report of non-examining physician, standing alone, was not substantial
evidence to support a denial of Medicaid disability benefits); State ex rel. Comm’r
of Ins. v. N.C. Fire Ins. Rating Bureau, 231 S.E.2d 882, 888–91 (N.C. 1977)
(reversing the Commissioner’s disapproval of the filing of the Rating Bureau
because the order was “supported only by conclusory findings of fact which, in
turn, are unsupported by material and substantial evidence in view of the entire
record”); Thompson, 233 S.E.2d at 541–44 (overturning Wake County School
Board, finding that dismissal of career teacher on grounds of immorality,
insubordination, and mental incapacity was not supported by substantial evidence
on the entire record); Underwood v. State Bd. of Alcoholic Control, 181 S.E.2d 1, 7
(N.C. 1971) (overturning State Board of Alcoholic Control, finding that suspension
of license was not supported by substantial evidence); State ex rel. Utils. Comm’n
v. Atlantic Coast Line R.R. Co., 150 S.E.2d 386, 389–91 (N.C. 1966) (overturning
Utilities Commission, finding that rejection of railroad’s application to reduce
agent hours was not supported by competent, material and substantial evidence in
the record, and was therefore arbitrary and capricious).
79
In re Rogers, 253 S.E.2d 912, 922 (N.C. 1979) (noting that “with few
exceptions judicial review of administrative decisions in North Carolina is under
the ‘whole record’ test,” and that the policy of the APA and other statutes favor the
whole record test of judicial review).
80
N.C. GEN. STAT. § 90-14.1 (2013) (when reviewing the Medical
Board’s decision denying issuance of a license, the decision of the Board shall be
upheld unless it is “not supported by any evidence admissible under this Article”);
N.C. GEN. STAT. § 90-14.10 (when reviewing the Medical Board’s decision taking
disciplinary action on a license, the court may reverse the Board if its decision is
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Employment Security82—agencies that were completely exempt from
the APA until January 1, 2012.83 Now that all three of these agencies
are subject to the APA, it is not clear whether the “any competent
evidence” review provisions in their organic statutes continue to be
valid, to the extent that they conflict with the APA or provide for a
standard of review that is not equivalent to whole record review.84

“not supported by competent, material, and substantial evidence admissible under
this Article”); In re Guess, 393 S.E.2d 833, 838 (N.C. 1989) (ruling that “[j]udicial
review of a decision by the Board of Medical Examiners is made according to what
is frequently referred to as the ‘any competent evidence’ standard”); In re Rogers,
253 S.E.2d at 922 n.4 (noting the same).
81
N.C. GEN. STAT. § 97-86 (on review, the orders of the Industrial
Commission “shall be conclusive and binding as to all questions of fact; but either
party to the dispute may . . . appeal from the decision of said Commission to the
Court of Appeals for errors of law under the same terms and conditions as govern
appeals from the superior court to the Court of Appeals in ordinary civil actions”)
(emphasis added). The Supreme Court interprets this statute to require “any
competent evidence” review of the Commission’s findings of fact. Deese v.
Champion Int’l Corp., 530 S.E.2d 549, 552 (N.C. 2000); Adams v. AVX Corp.,
509 S.E.2d 411, 414 (N.C. 1998). Appeals from the Industrial Commission are
made directly to the Court of Appeals. N.C. GEN. STAT. § 7A-250(b).
82
N.C. GEN. STAT. § 96-15(i) (on review, the “finding of facts by the
Commission, if there is any competent evidence to support them and in the absence
of fraud, shall be conclusive, and the jurisdiction of the court shall be confined to
questions of law”) (emphasis added); see Edgecombe Cnty. Dep’t of Soc. Servs. v.
Hickman, 712 S.E.2d 209, 211 (N.C. 2011); Binney v. Banner Therapy Prods. Inc.,
661 S.E.2d 717, 720 (N.C. 2008).
83
The original APA listed all three of these agencies as completely
exempt. Administrative Procedure Act, ch. 1331, 1973 N.C. Sess. Laws 692. All
three agencies predated the enactment of the APA, which likely explains why their
organic statutes specify a standard of review inconsistent with the APA. The
Medical Board was created in 1859; the Industrial Commission was created in
1929; and the Division of Employment Security, formerly called the Employment
Security Commission, was created in 1935.
84
See Hanft, supra note 76, at 818–19 (suggesting that the “any competent
evidence” standard is invalid for failure to provide adequate judicial review); State
ex rel. Comm’r of Ins. v. N.C. Rate Bureau, 269 S.E.2d 547, 559 (N.C. 1980)
(holding that “adequate procedure for judicial review . . . exists only if the scope of
review is equal to that under present Article 4 of G.S. Chapter 150[B]”).
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Arbitrary, Capricious, or an Abuse of Discretion

If a party asserts that an agency action is “arbitrary,
capricious, or an abuse of discretion,”85 the superior court must also
conduct whole record review. 86 Agency action is arbitrary,
capricious, or an abuse of discretion if it fails to reflect reasoned
decision-making, is whimsical, patently in bad faith, or manifestly
unfair. 87 This category reflects the basic due process notion that
government decisions must, at a minimum, be rational. It functions
as a “catchall” category of error that overlaps with the substantial
evidence category,88 and, because the two fact-intensive assertions of
error are not easily distinguishable, they are frequently made in
tandem.89
The assertion that agency action is arbitrary and capricious is
also made in cases that are not well suited to review for substantial
evidence on the record because the agency’s action has not produced
a record for review. Thus, for example, agencies sometimes make
decisions but are not statutorily required to hold a hearing or make
formal record findings. Without a record, it is impossible for a court
to look for substantial evidence that supports the agency’s decision,
but it is still possible to determine whether the decision was arbitrary
or capricious. 90 Similarly, if a decision is committed to agency
discretion, there may be no evidentiary record for the reviewing court
85

N.C. GEN. STAT. § 150B-51(b)(6).
Daye, supra note 35, at 1606–07.
87
In re Parkdale Mills, 741 S.E.2d 416, 419 (N.C. 2013); Comm’r of Ins.
v. Rate Bureau, 269 S.E.2d at 573 (N.C. 1980); Lewis v. N.C. Dep’t of Human
Res., 375 S.E.2d 712, 714 (N.C. Ct. App. 1989).
88
Daye, supra note 35, at 1606–07 (noting that any agency decision not
supported by substantial evidence on the record is, by definition, also arbitrary and
capricious).
89
E.g., R.J. Reynolds Tobacco Co. v. N.C. Dep’t of Env’t & Natural Res.,
560 S.E.2d 163, 168 (N.C. Ct. App. 2002); Joyce v. Winston-Salem Univ., 370
S.E.2d 866, 868 (N.C. Ct. App. 1988); see also EDWARDS & ELLIOT, supra note 38,
at 182–83 (discussing subtle ways in which the differences between the two
standards of review are “not great,” but “more than merely semantic”).
90
See, e.g., Lewis, 375 S.E.2d at 715 (finding that agency was not
arbitrary and capricious in denying grievance petition as untimely filed when
petition was submitted one day after deadline); R.J. Reynolds Tobacco Co., 560
S.E.2d at 170 (finding arbitrary and capricious agency denial of certification
application when agency did not inspect facility).
86
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to examine, but the court reviews the decision to ensure that the
agency exercised its discretion “in good faith and in accordance with
law.”91
The assertion that agency action is arbitrary, capricious, or an
abuse of discretion can also arise in cases involving formal hearings,
and even when an agency’s order is supported by substantial
evidence. In State ex rel. Commissioner of Insurance v. North
Carolina Rate Bureau, for example, the North Carolina Insurance
Commissioner issued an order, following a hearing on a rate filing,
that insurance companies must submit audited data to the
Commission because unaudited data was not credible.92 The North
Carolina Supreme Court found that the Commissioner’s order was
supported by substantial evidence—uncontested expert testimony at
the hearing—but, nevertheless, was arbitrary and capricious because
it was “grossly imprecise in attempting to enunciate a substantive
rule involving sweeping ramifications.”93 In other words, the court
corrected the agency for improperly announcing an important rule
without providing guidance as to the meaning of the rule.
C.

Three Exceptions to the Default Rule of Appellate Jurisdiction

As previously explained, Article 4 of the APA is intended to
provide a uniform system for the review of cases appealed from
agencies, whereby most appeals from an agency order invoke the
appellate jurisdiction of the reviewing court and the standards of
review described in section 150B-51. However, a number of
exemptions from the APA disrupt the uniformity contemplated by the
statute. The exemptions occur in three places: in agencies entirely
exempt from the APA; in actions governed by the pre-2012 version
of section 150B-51(c); and most significantly, in the complex tangle
of agency-specific statutes that confer standards of review. The
following subsections will discuss these topics in turn.

91

ACT-UP Triangle v. Comm’n for Health Servs., 483 S.E.2d 388, 393
(N.C. 1997).
92
Comm’r of Ins., 269 S.E.2d at 558–59.
93
Id. at 573.
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Agencies Exempt from the APA

A very small number of agencies are entirely exempt from the
APA, including the provisions regarding judicial review. 94 A
superior court must consult the specific jurisdictional statutes for
exempt agencies to determine the appropriate standard of review.
The largest agency that remains entirely exempt from the
APA is the Utilities Commission. 95 Appeals from the Utilities
Commission must be made directly to the North Carolina Court of
Appeals, invoking its appellate jurisdiction. 96 This particular
exemption does not especially threaten the uniformity of the review
scheme contemplated by the APA, as the judicial review provisions
in the Utility Commission’s organic statute are essentially identical to
the standards of review in section 150B-51. 97 Thus, in practice, the
existence of a few APA-exempt agencies does not significantly
change the default rule that the reviewing court has appellate
jurisdiction over agency appeals.
94

N.C. GEN. STAT. § 150B-1(c) (2013) (exempting fully from the
APA (1) the North Carolina National Guard in exercising its court-martial
jurisdiction; (2) the Department of Health and Human Services in
exercising its authority over the Camp Butner reservation granted in
Article 6 of Chapter 122C of the General Statutes; (3) the Utilities
Commission; (4) the State Board of Elections in administering the HAVA
Administrative Complaint Procedure of Article 8A of Chapter 163 of the
General Statutes; and (5) the North Carolina State Lottery).
95
N.C. GEN. STAT. § 150B-1(c). The legislature made the Industrial
Commission and the Division of Employment Security subject to the APA as of
January 1, 2012. Protecting and Putting North Carolina Back to Work Act, 2011
N.C. Sess. Laws 1087, 1101; An Act to Reform the Employment Security Laws of
North Carolina, 2011 N.C Sess. Laws 1717, 1721.
96
N.C. GEN. STAT. § 7A-250(b).
97
See N.C. GEN. STAT. §§ 62–94; State ex rel. Utils. Comm’n v. Bird Oil
Co., 273 S.E.2d 232, 235 n.1 (N.C. 1980) (noting the “slight variation in wording”
between the review provisions in section 62–94 and the APA, and concluding that
the legislature intended for “judicial review of orders of the Utilities Commission
and other state agencies covered by the Administrative Procedure Act to be
essentially the same”); State ex rel. Utils. Comm’n v. Public Staff-N.C. Utils.
Comm’n, 472 S.E.2d 193, 195–96 (N.C. Ct. App. 1996) (noting that “[w]here the
Commission’s actions do not violate the Constitution or exceed statutory authority,
appellate review is limited to errors of law, arbitrary action, or decisions
unsupported by competent, material and substantial evidence”) (quoting State ex
rel. Utils. Comm’n v. Springdale Estates Ass’n, 265 S.E.2d 647, 651 (N.C. Ct.
App. 1980)).
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Appeals from Final Agency Decisions Where the Agency Has
Not Adopted an Administrative Law Judge’s Recommended
Decision

The second minor exception to the default rule of appellate
jurisdiction is found in section 150B-51(c) of the APA, as it existed
prior to 2012;98 as a practical matter, this exemption will soon cease
to exist. Previously, section 150B-51(c) required the superior court
to exercise a limited form of original jurisdiction over contested
cases, but only if the case had previously been heard in the OAH and
the agency did not adopt the ALJ’s recommended decision.99 In this
event, the superior court would “review the official record, de novo,
and . . . make findings of fact and conclusions of law,” giving no
deference to “to any prior decision made in the case,” including “the
findings of fact or the conclusions of law contained in the agency's
final decision.” 100 Despite the wording, the statute did not confer
original jurisdiction on the superior court because it did not authorize
the reviewing court to take new evidence; rather, the reviewing court
was authorized to determine whether the petitioner was entitled to
relief “based upon its review of the official record.” 101 In other
words, when a case presented itself in this particular procedural
posture, the APA conferred a hybrid form of jurisdiction on the
superior court. This hybrid form was part de novo, in the sense that
the court considered the findings of law and fact anew and was
permitted to make its own findings of fact even when neither party

98

See 2000 N.C. Sess. Laws 190.
Some, but not all, of the agencies subject to the APA are required by
section 150B-23 to conduct contested case hearings before the OAH. N.C. GEN.
STAT. § 150B-23. Prior to January 1, 2012, the OAH would issue a recommended
decision, where the agency could adopt all, none, or any part of it. See S. Res. 781
§ 18, Gen. Assemb., 2011 Sess. (N.C. 2011) (amending N.C. GEN. STAT. § 150B34) and N.C. GEN. STAT. § 150B-36 (amended 2011). Other agencies conduct their
own hearings of contested cases, pursuant to the rules in Article 3A of the APA.
See N.C. GEN. STAT. § 150B-38(a) (2013) (listing agencies subject to Article 3A).
100
S. Res. 781 § 27 (amending N.C. GEN. STAT. § 150B-51(c)).
101
Id.; Brad Miller, What Were We Thinking?: Legislative Intent and the
2000 Amendments to the North Carolina APA, 79 N.C. L. REV. 1657, 1665 (2011)
(indicating that the superior court’s de novo review of the facts is based on the
official record); Daye, supra note 35, at 1607–10.
99
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objected to them,102 but also limited, in the sense that the court was
confined to the facts presented in the administrative record and could
not take new evidence.103 The purpose of this legislation was to put
the aggrieved party and the agency on a more equal footing and to
enhance the stature of ALJs and the OAH by giving a broader scope
of judicial review to agency decisions that rejected an ALJ’s
decision.104
In 2011, the legislature amended the APA, making the ALJ’s
decision a “final decision” rather than a “recommended decision.”105
In the new statute, the agency is no longer empowered to adopt “all,
none, or part” of the ALJ’s decision. 106 Instead, the agency can
petition the superior court for judicial review if it disagrees with the
ALJ’s order.107 These amendments took effect on January 1, 2012,
and apply to contested cases commenced on or after that date. 108
Thus the exception in former section 150B-51(c) will soon be moot,
once the appeals of all matters commenced prior to the effective date
of the amendment are concluded.

102

Cape Med. Trans., Inc. v. N.C. Dep’t of Health & Human Servs., 590
S.E.2d 8, 14 (N.C. Ct. App. 2004).
103
See Meza v. Div. of Soc. Servs., 692 S.E.2d 96, 101 (N.C. 2010)
(opining that under N.C. Gen. Stat. § 150B-51(c), when the agency rejects the
administrative law judge’s recommendation, “the superior court is mandated to
make findings of fact de novo, albeit on the official administrative record as
opposed to taking new testimony”).
104
Judge Julian Mann, III, Administrative Justice: No Longer Just a
Recommendation, 79 N.C. L. REV. 1639, 1640 (2001); Daye, supra note 35, at
1577–78; Miller, supra note 101, at 1658.
105
Regulatory Reform Act of 2011 § 18, 2011 N.C. Sess. Laws 1678,
1686–87 (amending N.C. GEN. STAT. § 150B-34–Decision of ALJ).
106
Id.
107
Regulatory Reform Act of 2011 § 22, 2011 N.C. Sess. Laws 1687
(amending N.C. GEN. STAT. § 150B-43–Right to Judicial Review); § 15, 2011 N.C.
Sess. Laws 1685 (amending N.C. GEN. STAT. § 150B-2(5)–definition of “Party”).
108
A “contested case” begins when either the agency or the individual
begins an administrative proceeding to determine that person’s “rights, duties, or
privileges.” N.C. GEN. STAT. § 150B-22. The case is commenced when the
petitioner pays the fee and the petition with the OAH and the fee paid. N.C. GEN.
STAT. § 150B-23.
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Agencies with Agency-Specific Judicial Review Statutes

The final category of exceptions to the default rule of
appellate jurisdiction is found in the dozens of agency-specific
statutes providing for judicial review.109 When one of these agencyspecific statutes governs an appeal, the superior court must examine
the statute to determine whether it requires the superior court’s
jurisdiction to be original or appellate. And even when the
jurisdiction conferred is appellate, it can sometimes be difficult to
determine whether the statutory language is meant to confer APA
style jurisdiction or something slightly different—there is little
consistency in the language used in these judicial review provisions
and some downright confusing locutions. Part III of this Article will
highlight some of the problems raised by the statutes that specifically
confer jurisdiction over administrative appeals and will suggest
legislative changes to simplify, clarify, and standardize the
jurisdiction these agency-specific statutes confer.
III.
SUGGESTIONS FOR SIMPLIFYING, CLARIFYING, AND
STANDARDIZING AGENCY-SPECIFIC STATUTES PROVIDING FOR
JUDICIAL REVIEW
It bears repeating that one of the express purposes of the
North Carolina APA is to create “a uniform system” of state
administrative action, including the judicial review of administrative
action.110 Uniformity is so commonly accepted as a positive value in
a procedural system that its benefits tend to be assumed without
analysis.111 While uniformity should not be treated as an end unto
109

See Appendix.
N.C. GEN. STAT. § 150B-1-52 (emphasis added); Empire Power Co. v.
N.C. Dep’t of Env’t, Health & Natural Res., 447 S.E.2d 768, 778 (N.C. 1994)
(noting the goal of uniformity in the APA). Despite encoding this goal of
uniformity in the APA, the legislature has inconsistently pursued it. For example,
the legislature has granted certain agencies, generally covered by the APA,
exemptions from APA rulemaking requirements. RICHARD B. WHISNANT,
RULEMAKING IN NORTH CAROLINA 3 (2005).
111
But see Marin Levy, The Mechanics of Federal Appeals: Uniformity
and Case Management in the Circuit Courts of Appeals, 61 DUKE L.J. 315, 377–83
(2011) (arguing that some disuniformity in case management in the federal courts
of appeals is justifiable); Amanda Frost, Overvaluing Uniformity, 94 VA. L. REV.
1567, 1570–72 (2008) (questioning whether uniformity in the interpretation of
110

Fall 2013

Simplifying the Standard of Review

611

itself, the values of having uniform standards of review are
particularly compelling in North Carolina. First, uniform standards
of review streamline the decision-making process for a superior court
judge, who can quickly master the standards of review in the APA
and can then be confident that these standards apply in all future
agency appeals. Second, uniform standards of review efficiently
allocate resources between judicial and administrative decision
makers. 112 These efficiencies are especially important when the
reviewing judges are elected officials who carry large caseloads
dominated by civil and criminal trials,113 have no law clerks, and may
be unfamiliar with administrative law from any work before judicial
service. Third, by standardizing the applicable law, uniform
standards of review help to avoid errors in the superior court that
result in protracted appeals and further litigation.114 Finally, uniform
standards of review generally bolster systemic values such as
rationality, predictability, coherence, and legitimacy. 115 Litigants
will not be left wondering why one petitioner received appellate
review in the superior court while another obtained a trial de novo.
The benefits of the uniformity envisioned by the APA are
currently undermined by the confusing array of agency-specific
judicial review statutes, some of which confer original jurisdiction—
or an exotic hybrid jurisdiction—on the superior courts, and some of
substantive federal rules is always preferable); Philip J. Weiser, Chevron,
Cooperative Federalism, and Telecommunications Reform, 52 VAND. L. REV. 1,
39–53 (1999) (arguing that the federal courts should “accept a certain amount of
diversity in cooperative federalism programs).
112
See Daye, supra note 35, at 1577 (noting that the goal of judicial
review is to achieve a “workable and adequate system of external constraint on
agency decisions through judicial oversight when citizens aggrieved by those
decisions seek review”); see also text accompanying notes 127–132.
113
N.C. ADMIN. OFFICE OF THE COURTS, NORTH CAROLINA COURTS,
ANNUAL REPORT 10 (July 1, 2011–June 30, 2012), available at
http://www.nccourts.org/Citizens/Publications/Documents/201112_AnnualReport_20130328.pdf.
114
See infra text accompanying notes 141–154, 165–166.
115
See Dickinson v. Zurko, 527 U.S. 150, 154 (1999) (in the federal
context, “recognizing the importance of maintaining a uniform approach to judicial
review of administrative action” when the federal APA “was meant to bring
uniformity to a field full of variation and diversity”); Kathryn E. Kovacs, Leveling
the Deference Playing Field, 90 OR. L. REV. 583, 600 (2011) (noting that
inconsistent application of standards of review creates unwelcome doctrinal
confusion for agencies, plaintiffs, and regulated industries).
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which confer appellate jurisdiction but do so in confusing,
idiosyncratic, or anachronistic (pre-APA) terms. 116 This section
develops a framework for analyzing whether these statutory
departures from the norm of appellate jurisdiction are justified. It
then reviews the seventeen statutes that vest original or hybrid
jurisdiction over administrative appeals in the superior court; this
section recommends legislative revisions for all but two of them. In
addition, this section urges the legislature to revise the numerous
agency-specific statutes that confer appellate jurisdiction in a way
that will clarify and conform their jurisdiction-conferring language.
A.
More Procedure than is Due? Agency-Specific Review
Statutes Conferring Original or Hybrid Jurisdiction in the Superior
Courts
The agency-specific review statutes that differ most
significantly from the APA are the seventeen statutes that vest
original or hybrid jurisdiction in the superior courts. This section
develops a framework for analyzing whether these statutes provide
more procedure than is due for parties appealing an agency order.
Presumably, the statutes that confer original or hybrid
jurisdiction were crafted with the laudable goal of providing
aggrieved parties with adequate procedural protections, in the form of
a new trial (or, in the case of hybrid jurisdiction, something very
close to a new trial) in the superior court. Thus, a legislative revision
that removes procedural protections from litigants raises due process
concerns, and before recommending such a revision it is important to
consider whether the extraordinary 117 procedural protections
116

Charles E. Daye, North Carolina’s New Administrative Procedure Act:
An Interpretive Analysis, 53 N.C. L. Rev. 833, 899 (1974–1975) (arguing that the
variety of judicial review statutes threatens the APA’s goal of uniformity); Hanft,
supra note 76, at 819 (noting that North Carolina statutes contain a “needless
variety” of judicial review statutes).
117
The North Carolina Supreme Court has already approved of the
appellate standards of review in the APA, and thus appellate review is a
constitutionally adequate baseline for most appeals from agency cases. See State
ex rel. Comm’r of Ins. v. N.C. Rate Bureau, 269 S.E.2d 547, 559 (N.C. 1980)
(holding that “‘adequate procedure for judicial review,’ as those words appear in
present G.S. 150A-43, exists only if the scope of review is equal to that under
present Article 4 of G.S. Chapter 150A”). Because appellate review of
administrative action is the statutory default, any upward deviation from that
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conferred by these statutes are warranted by the circumstances they
address. This analysis implicates numerous procedural values that
must be balanced, including the interests of the individual—e.g., the
magnitude of the individual interest at stake in the proceeding—and
the more systemic interests described previously—e.g., the public
interests in streamlining the review process and in avoiding the
unnecessary burdens on judicial resources caused by an inappropriate
allocation of authority between agencies and reviewing courts.118 A
general framework for weighing these competing interests can be
derived from the seminal case on procedural due process, Matthews
v. Eldridge, which measures “how much procedure is due” by
weighing three factors in what essentially amounts to a cost-benefit
analysis:
First, the private interest that will be affected by the
official action; second, the risk of an erroneous
deprivation of such interest through the procedures
used, and the probable value, if any, of additional or
substitute procedural safeguards; and finally, the
government's interest, including the function involved
and the fiscal and administrative burdens that the
additional or substitute procedural requirement would
entail.119

norm—i.e., original or hybrid jurisdiction—is presumably justified only by unusual
circumstances.
118
Daye, supra note 116, at 845.
119
Matthews v. Eldridge, 424 U.S. 319, 334–35 (1976). The Law of the
Land Clause of Article I, § 19 of the North Carolina constitution, provides that “no
person shall be . . . deprived of his life, liberty, or property, but by the law of the
land,” and “is synonymous with the fourteenth amendment due process clause of
the federal Constitution.” McNeill v. Harnett Cnty., 398 S.E.2d 475, 563 (N.C.
1990); In re Moore, 221 S.E.2d 307, 308 (N.C. 1976). The United States Supreme
Court’s interpretations of the Fourteenth Amendment are “highly persuasive” in
construing the Law of the Land Clause. Bulova Watch Co. v. Brand Distribs., 206
S.E.2d 141, 146 (N.C. 1974). While it is beyond the scope of this Article to
construct a constitutional argument for each statute, the method of analysis for
determining whether procedures are consistent with the federal and state
constitutions is a useful heuristic for determining whether the current and proposed
statutory schemes satisfy the goals of due process.
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In other words, when determining “how much procedure is due,” the
critical inquiry is whether the value to the individual of additional
procedures justifies the cost—in terms of money and other systemic
burdens—of providing those procedures. 120
The framework
suggested by Matthews is thus to determine whether there are
unusual circumstances, such as a particularly strong individual
interest at stake, that justify the imposition of extraordinary
procedural protections such as original jurisdiction in judicial review
proceedings in the superior courts.
While it is impossible to evaluate the Matthews factors in the
abstract, a few general observations guide the inquiry. First, the
amount of procedure due varies with the significance of the
individual interest at stake. Thus, litigants in an administrative
proceeding who are at risk of being deprived of a significant
benefit—e.g., a loss of welfare benefits (which are subsistence
benefits for the most destitute) or the loss of the right to attend school
because of a long-term school suspension—are entitled to more
procedural protections than those whose deprivation is less
significant—e.g., a loss of disability benefits (which are awarded
without consideration of economic need) or a shorter-term loss of the
right to attend school.121
Second, it is important to consider whether the additional
procedure at issue—original jurisdiction in the superior court—adds
significantly to the likelihood of achieving an accurate result or
avoiding an inaccurate one. Presumably, the value to the litigants of
a new trial in superior court comes from the more formal procedures
that govern litigation in that forum. When parties appealing from an
administrative order encounter original jurisdiction in the superior
court, they have access to the same array of information-gathering
120

The North Carolina Court of Appeals has applied the balancing test
from Matthews v. Eldridge in cases examining the due process rights of litigants in
state administrative actions. See, e.g., Nolan v. Town of Weddington, 578 S.E.2d
710, 2003 WL 1873514, at *4 (N.C. App. Apr. 15, 2003).
121
See Matthews, 424 U.S. at 340–42 (comparing the different interests at
stake in eligibility hearings for disability benefits and welfare benefits); Goldberg
v. Kelly, 397 U.S. 254, 264 (1970) (noting that “termination of aid pending
resolution of a controversy over eligibility may deprive an eligible recipient of the
very means by which to live while he waits”); Goss v. Lopez, 419 U.S. 565, 575–
76 (1975) (discussing school suspensions, and noting that the weight and the nature
of the interest at stake is relevant to the due process inquiry).
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and truth-enforcing procedures that are available to any civil litigant.
These procedures—rights to discover information, depose witnesses,
exclude hearsay, and cross-examine witnesses in open court (to name
a few)—are designed to maximize truth-seeking and are of greatest
value in cases that involve complex, disputed facts or where witness
credibility is a crucial issue.
These truth-seeking procedures may be of great value to a
petitioner for judicial review when the underlying administrative
procedure has not involved a contested case. In contrast, it is
unlikely that parties who have already litigated a contested case in
the OAH need an additional trial in superior court. After all,
contested cases provide almost all of the same truth-seeking
procedures to litigants, albeit in a less formal hearing. 122 Further,
elaborate truth-seeking procedures may be unnecessary in many
administrative disputes, especially ones that involve objective or
undisputed facts and non-discretionary determinations.123 Thus, for
example, if the Currituck Game Commission denies a duck blind
license to an applicant whose application is incomplete, the
disappointed applicant likely does not need a full trial in superior
court to resolve the dispute. 124 Indeed, many far more significant
agency decisions, involving complex and disputed facts and weighty
interests at stake, are reviewed by superior courts in their appellate
mode after a contested case.125
Third, it is important to consider the costs of the additional
procedural safeguard of a trial de novo in the superior court. These
costs come in many forms, one of which is complexity. By departing
from the uniform system of review contemplated by the APA, the
statutes risk confusing litigants and judges as to the correct standard
of review, resulting in protracted litigation.126 Another cost comes
122

See generally N.C. GEN. STAT. §§ 150B-23 to 150B-37 (2013)
(procedures in contested cases).
123
See Matthews, 424 U.S. at 343–44 (noting that disability termination
decisions were based on “routine, standard, and unbiased medical reports by
physician specialists” of patients whom they had actually examined and therefore
did not merit a contested evidentiary hearing).
124
See infra text accompanying note 157–161.
125
For example, the superior courts give appellate review to the denial of
an air quality permit. Parties first challenge the denial of permits in a contested
case before an Administrative Law Judge. N.C. GEN. STAT. §143-215.108(e).
126
See, e.g., infra text accompanying notes 141–168, 165–166.
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from the more formal and protracted nature of superior court
proceedings, where the state will need to defend the agency. Original
jurisdiction also builds redundancy into the system. A trial de novo
means that the superior court judge must repeat the fact-finding of
the lower tribunal, instead of simply reviewing the record for error.
Unless the dispute has a highly contested factual record, or involves
exceptionally important individual interests, it is difficult to believe
that such costs are justified by the possibility of achieving a more
accurate result.
Using superior court judges to retry administrative cases also
represents a misallocation of resources between the judicial and
executive branches of government. First, it makes the administrative
decisionmaker superfluous. 127 Second, it replaces the arguably
superior decisionmaker—an expert agency—with an arguably
inferior one—a generalist judge who may have little knowledge or
understanding of the particular statutory scheme at issue.128
By contrast, vesting appellate jurisdiction in the superior
courts has the beneficial effects of recognizing that agencies are in a
superior position as fact finders and decisionmakers in the
administrative process, capturing the efficiencies of administrative
adjudication, and avoiding the negative incentives of treating the
agency as a “pass through.”
Further, appellate jurisdiction
appropriately constrains the judicial branch from unduly interfering
with the administrative process.129 Thus, for example, even when the
granting of a license relies on some non-objective factors—such as
the requirement for “good moral character” to obtain a license to
practice medicine 130 —the denial of such a license might
appropriately be given appellate review in the superior court because
the expert administrators on the Medical Board (most of whom are

127

See N.C. Dep’t of Env’t & Natural Res. v. Carroll, 599 S.E.2d 888, 896
(N.C. 2004) (noting that the superior court’s de novo review of the agency’s fact
finding has the potential to “render an administrative agency’s statutory
responsibility to find facts in contested cases a pointless formality”).
128
See id. (noting the “institutional advantage” of the ALJ as fact finder).
129
See generally CHARLES ALAN WRIGHT & CHARLES KOCH, JR., 33 FED.
PRAC. & PROC. JUDICIAL REVIEW §§ 8330, 8332 (1st ed. 2013); McKart v. United
States, 395 U.S. 185, 194–95 (1969) (noting that the exhaustion requirement
similarly supports judicial economy and agency autonomy).
130
N.C. GEN. STAT. § 90-9.1(a)(3).
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doctors or involved in the medical profession 131 ) are in a better
position than the superior court to find facts and make informed
decisions about the type of character needed to practice medicine.132
Finally, it is important to remember that the superior court,
even when acting in its appellate capacity, wields considerable
authority to review and correct the lower tribunal’s decision. The
superior court is empowered to remand to the agency for
reconsideration any arbitrary or factually unsupported decisions, or to
order an appropriate result without remanding.133
The following subsections will analyze each of the statutes
that confer original or hybrid jurisdiction on the superior courts in
light of the framework and considerations suggested by Matthews v.
Eldridge. They conclude that, in almost every instance, the statutes
vesting original jurisdiction in the superior courts confer more
procedural protections than the circumstances require or that are cost
justified.
1.
a.

Revision Recommended
Statutes Enacted Prior to the APA

Several statutes conferring original jurisdiction in the superior
courts appear to have survived the enactment of the APA through
oversight. For example, section 90-210.94, which predates the APA,
provides that appeals from a decision of the Board of Funeral
Services revoking or suspending the license of a mutual burial
association are reviewed de novo in the superior court.134 Currently,
however, the Board of Funeral Services has the power to conduct
hearings in accordance with the APA 135 and can only suspend or

131

N.C. GEN. STAT. § 90-2(a).
See In re Guess, 393 S.E.2d 833, 837–38 (N.C. 1989) (acknowledging
the expertise of the Board of Medical Examiners).
133
N.C. GEN. STAT. § 150B-51(b) (authorizing the court to affirm,
remand, reverse or modify the agency order).
134
See N.C. GEN. STAT. § 90-210.94 (“[T]he clerk of superior court shall
place the matter upon the civil issue docket of the superior court and the same shall
be heard de novo.”).
135
N.C. GEN. STAT. § 90-210.23(d1) (“The Board is empowered to hold
hearings in accordance with the provisions of this Article and of Chapter 150B to
132
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revoke a license after a hearing. 136 While there may have been a
good reason to give the licensee a new trial in the superior court at
the time the statute was enacted, those reasons should probably be
revisited in light of the APA.
In addition to section 90-210.94, the pre-APA statutes
conferring original jurisdiction on the reviewing court include:
x Section 7A-250(c) 137 —“Appeals from rulings of
county game commissions” (enacted in 1965);
x Section 20-25 138 —appeals from a discretionary
revocation of a driver’s license (enacted in 1935);
x Section 20-279.2 139 —appeals from the orders of the
Commissioner of Motor Vehicles enforcing the Motor
Vehicle Safety and Financial Responsibility Act of
1953; and
x Sections 90-14.1 and 90-14.10 140 —appeals from
decisions of the North Carolina Medical Board
subpoena witnesses and to administer oaths to or receive the affirmation of
witnesses before the Board.”).
136
N.C. GEN. STAT. § 90-210.86.
137
N.C. GEN. STAT. § 7A-250(c) (“Appeals from rulings of county game
commissions shall be heard in the district court division. The appeal shall be heard
de novo before a district court judge sitting in the county in which the game
commission whose ruling is being appealed is located.”); see infra Part III.A.1.c.
138
N.C. GEN. STAT. § 20-25 (“Any person denied a license or whose
license has been canceled, suspended or revoked by the Division, except where
such cancellation is mandatory under the provisions of this Article, shall have a
right to file a petition . . . for a hearing in the matter in the superior court of the
county wherein such person shall reside . . . and such court or judge is hereby
vested with jurisdiction and it shall be its or his duty . . . to take testimony and
examine into the facts of the case, and to determine whether the petitioner is
entitled to a license or is subject to suspension, cancellation or revocation of license
under the provisions of this Article.”); Cole v. Faulkner, 573 S.E.2d 614, 616 (N.C.
Ct. App. 2002) (citing In re Wright, 45 S.E.2d 370 (N.C. 1947)) (finding that “a
right to de novo review in superior court exists where there is a discretionary
denial, cancellation, suspension, or revocation of a driver’s license by the DMV.”);
see infra Part III.A.1.d.
139
N.C. GEN. STAT. § 20-279.2(b); see also infra Part III.A.1.d.
140
N.C. GEN. STAT. § 90-14.1 (“Upon appeal the case shall be heard by
the judge without a jury, upon the record, except that in cases of alleged omissions
or errors in the record, testimony may be taken by the court.”); N.C. GEN. STAT. §
90-14.10 (“Upon the review of the Board’s decision taking disciplinary action on a
license, the case shall be heard by the judge without a jury, upon the record, except
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(enacted in 1953) (conferring a hybrid form of original
and appellate jurisdiction).
At a minimum, the legislature should review these statutes
and consider revising them to conform to the review provisions of the
APA, conferring appellate jurisdiction in the superior court. All of
these statutes are discussed in more detail in the following
subsections.
b.

Statutes Conferring Hybrid Original/Appellate Jurisdiction

In addition to the statutes conferring original jurisdiction, the
legislature has also experimented with hybrid review provisions that
introduce further complication into the jurisdictional question. Three
agency-specific statutes confer either original or appellate
jurisdiction on the superior court:
x Section 108A-79(k) 141 —appeals from benefits
determinations made by the Department of Health and
Human Services, and
x Sections 90-14.1 and 90-14.10 142 —appeals from
licensing and disciplinary decisions of the North
Carolina Medical Board.
The standard of review in these statutes is problematic for
several reasons. First, the statutes require a complex and unusual
form of review, and anomalous legislation of this sort creates the
potential for judicial error and protracted litigation. Section 108A79(k) provides that the hearing in the superior court

that in cases of alleged omissions or errors in the record, testimony thereon may be
taken by the court.”); see infra Part III.A.1.b.
141
N.C. GEN. STAT. § 108A-79(k).
142
N.C. GEN. STAT. §§ 90-14.1, 90-14.10; see supra note 140 and
accompanying text.

620

Journal of the National Association of Administrative Law Judiciary

33-2

shall be conducted according to the provisions of
Article 4, Chapter 150B . . . . The court shall, on
request, examine the evidence excluded at the hearing
. . . and if the evidence was improperly excluded, the
court shall consider it. Notwithstanding the foregoing
provisions, the court may take testimony and examine
into the facts of the case, including excluded
evidence, to determine whether the final decision is in
error . . . .143
As the North Carolina Supreme Court noted in Meza v. Division of
Social Services, however, a comparison of the standards of review in
section 150B-51(b) and section 108A-79(k) shows that they are
plainly inconsistent. 144 In construing the scheme of review
contemplated by this statute, the supreme court concluded that the
superior court should first conduct an APA-style review, examining
questions of law de novo and questions of fact under the whole
record test, as in section 150B-51(b). 145 If the superior court
concludes that the agency’s findings of fact are not supported by
substantial evidence in the record, it then has the option either to
remand the case to the agency for further proceedings or to conduct
its own new trial on the facts and law in the case.146 The court did
not comment on the reasons for or wisdom of this complex hybrid of
judicial review, but its costs are evident. It took five years and three
levels of judicial review in Meza before the case was finally

143

N.C. GEN. STAT. § 108A-79(k).
Meza v. Div. of Soc. Servs., 692 S.E.2d 96, 100 (N.C. 2010).
145
Id. at 102.
146
Id. It is not clear from the statute whether the superior court has the
option of exercising de novo review absent a finding that the agency’s decision is
not supported by substantial evidence, although language appearing in the Meza
opinion suggests that the superior court always has that option. See id. at 105
(emphasis added) (“In conclusion, we hold that the standard of review of an agency
decision under N.C.G.S. § 108A-79(k) is de novo when the superior court exercises
its statutory authority to ‘take testimony and examine into the facts of the case . . .
to determine whether the final decision is in error under federal and State law.’ If,
however, the superior court proceeds solely upon the administrative record, the
hearing is governed by the provisions of the [APA], in which questions of fact are
reviewed under the whole record test and questions of law are reviewed de novo.”).
144
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remanded to the superior court for a trial using the appropriate
standard of review. 147
The second problem with these hybrid jurisdictional statutes
is that their cost is not justified by any clear advantage of a more
accurate result in the superior courts. Under section 108A-79(k), the
superior court has the option to refuse to exercise its original
jurisdiction and remand to the agency, even when the agency’s
findings of fact are unsupported by substantial evidence.148 Thus, the
hybrid review provides little guarantee of greater procedural
safeguards to the aggrieved party.
Finally, a de novo trial in the superior court likely would be
redundant. When making benefit determinations, the Department of
Health and Human Services provides administrative hearings subject
to the contested case provisions of the APA.149 Original jurisdiction
in the superior court is also a misallocation of judicial resources, as
the agencies making the initial determination are experts in their
complex and highly technical areas. To the extent that these hybrid
jurisdiction statutes were modeled on the hybrid procedures in former
section 150B-151(c), those procedures have now been abandoned by
the legislature and should be abandoned here.150
147

Id. at 98. The North Carolina Supreme Court finally set forth the
correct standard of review five years after the Department of Social Services denied
the petitioner’s application for Medicaid benefits. Id. The supreme court reversed
the decisions of the appellate and superior courts, finding that the superior court
had incorrectly applied the statutory standard of review. Id. at 105–06.
148
See id. at 102 (“[O]nce the superior court determines, based on the
whole record test, that the findings of fact are not supported by substantial evidence
in the record and, therefore, cannot support the hearing officer's conclusions of law,
the court can follow one of two procedures. The court can remand the case to the
agency for further proceedings, or the court can take evidence, make findings of
fact, and draw its own conclusions of law from the findings thus made.”).
149
See generally N.C. GEN. STAT. § 108A-79(a)–(j) (2013) (providing for
a hearing after a denial of benefits with a right to appeal to the Department). The
Medical Board is also subject to the contested case provisions of the APA. N.C.
GEN. STAT. § 90-14.1 (providing for a hearing after a denial of a license to practice
medicine); N.C. GEN. STAT. § 90-14.2 (2013) (providing for a hearing concerning
proposed disciplinary action by the Medical Board); N.C. GEN. STAT. § 150B-1(e)
(mandating that “[t]he contested case provisions of [the] Chapter apply to all
agencies and all proceedings not expressly exempted from the Chapter”).
150
See Meza, 692 S.E.2d at 101 (noting that the hybrid procedures in
section 108A-79(k) resemble the hybrid procedures of the now-repealed section
150B-51(c)).
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While it has never been construed in a reported opinion, two
statutes governing appeals from the licensing and disciplinary
decisions of the North Carolina Medical Board also appear to confer
a form of hybrid jurisdiction.151 As previously noted, these statutes
pre-date the APA.152
The legislature should revise all of these statutes to conform
to the review provisions of the APA, conferring only appellate
jurisdiction in the superior court.
c.

Initial Decision Not Made by an Agency or Officer in the
Executive Branch

Another group of statutes that confer original jurisdiction in
the reviewing court governs quasi-administrative actions taken by
government entities that are not agencies or officers in the state
executive branch. For purposes of applying the APA, section 150B2(1a) defines “agency” as “an agency or officer in the executive
branch of the government of this State,” but specifically excludes any
“local unit of government” and implicitly excludes any departments
of the legislative or judicial branches. 153
Thus, licensing,
registration, or other decisions made initially at the county level are
not subject to the contested case requirements of the APA. However,
because the conferral of original jurisdiction commits judicial
resources, it is appropriate to discuss these statutes in the context of
other administrative appeals.

151

N.C. GEN. STAT. §§ 90-14.1, 90-14.10; see supra note 140 and
accompanying text.
152
See supra Part III.A.1.a.
153
See N.C. GEN. STAT. § 150B-2(1a). Three statutes provide for original
jurisdiction in the superior court of decisions made initially by a district court or the
clerk of the superior court. See N.C. GEN. STAT. § 20-28.5(e) (review of district
court’s entry of forfeiture of a motor vehicle is heard in the superior court de novo);
N.C. GEN. STAT. § 108A-37(c) (review of clerk of court’s appointment of a
personal representative for a recipient of public assistance is made by superior
court, “de novo without a jury”); N.C. GEN. STAT. § 111-30 (review of clerk of
court’s appointment of a personal representative for a recipient of aid to the blind is
made by superior court, “de novo without a jury”). Because these statutes deal
with decisions made wholly within the judicial department of the state, they are
outside the scope of this Article.
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The following statutes provide for original jurisdiction over
appeals from decisions not made in the first instance by agencies of
the state:
x Section 7A-250(c)154—vesting original jurisdiction in the
district court over appeals from the rulings of county
game commissions;
x Section 67-4.1 155 —appeals from a local animal control
board declaring a dog to be “potentially dangerous.”
The rationale for giving original jurisdiction to the judicial
branch in appeals from these matters is presumably156 to ensure that
the aggrieved party receives at least one hearing with strong
procedural safeguards, as decisions made by the lower tribunal are
not governed by APA procedures. For several reasons, these statutes
should be revised to vest appellate, not original, jurisdiction in the
superior court.
First, as noted above, section 7A-250(c) is obsolete.157 It was
enacted in 1965; it predates the APA and the 1979 reorganization of
the state’s wildlife laws, which stripped all but two county
governments (Dare and Currituck) of control over wildlife
management and vested control in the North Carolina Wildlife
Resources Commission, a state agency. 158 The two remaining
functional county game commissions issue licenses for duck hunting
blinds. 159 Arguably, the licenses implicate important individual
154

N.C. GEN. STAT. § 7A-250(c); see supra note 137 and accompanying

text.
155

N.C. GEN. STAT. § 67-4.1(c) (“The appeal shall be heard de novo
before a superior court judge sitting in the county in which the appellate Board
whose ruling is being appealed is located.”); Caswell Cnty. v. Hanks, 462 S.E.2d
841, 842–43 (N.C. Ct. App. 1995) (trial court reversed for not conducting de novo
trial).
156
There is no relevant legislative history for most of these statutes and
thus the reasons for the prescribed judicial review standard must be presumed in
most cases. Legislative history will be cited where available and relevant.
157
See supra Part III.A.1.a.
158
N.C. GEN. STAT. § 113-133.1. See generally About North Carolina
Wildlife Resources Commission, N.C. WILDLIFE RESOURCES COMMISSION,
http://www.ncwildlife.org/about.aspx (last visited Oct. 24, 2013).
159
About the Commission, CURRITUCK CNTY. GAME COMM’N,
http://www.currituckgamecommission.org/About%20The%20Commission.html
(last visited Oct. 24, 2013); Game and Wildlife Commission, DARE CNTY.,
http://www.darenc.com/gov/brdlist_gw.asp (last visited Oct. 24, 2013).
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interests—the ability to shoot ducks from behind a duck blind160—
and the consequences of erroneous deprivation are severe—the
potential loss of a season of duck hunting. However, given that the
applications for such licenses have no discretionary elements,161 there
is only a small chance that a de novo trial in the district court will add
significantly to a more accurate result. Finally, while trials de novo
of the orders of these two game commissions are unlikely to cause a
significant drain on the resources of the court, it makes little sense, in
the context of objective licensing decisions, to provide for original,
rather than appellate, jurisdiction.
Second, the statutes build costly redundancy into the system
without justifying the cost of duplicative superior court proceedings.
For example, section 67-4.1 vests original jurisdiction in the superior
court over appeals from the order of a local animal control board
declaring a dog to be “dangerous” or “potentially dangerous.”162 The
statute anticipates a two-stage process at the local level: an initial
determination following an investigation, and in the event of an
appeal by the dog owner, a final determination following a hearing
before a board.163 Thus, by the time the owner files an appeal in the
superior court, she has already had the benefit of two administrative
determinations and it is not clear that a new trial in the superior court
is justified. Weighing in favor of original jurisdiction, the owner has
a strong interest in avoiding the additional burden of owning a dog
160

See, e.g., Joe Balog, Part Three: Interview with Phil Robertson,
&
RETRIEVER
(Nov.
18,
2010),
WATERFOWL
http://www.grandviewoutdoors.com/duckhunting/articlecontent/11/2010/1481/part-three:-interview-with-phil-robertson
(conveying eponymous advice from Phil Robertson, duck hunting guru).
161
See, e.g., 2013/2014 Blind License Application, DARE CNTY., available
at http://www.darenc.com/gov/brdlist_gw_license.pdf (requiring the applicant to
verify her name, address, and North Carolina hunting license number, to provide a
description of the requested location of the duck blind, and pay a fee).
162
N.C. GEN. STAT. § 67-4.1 (“The appeal shall be heard de novo before a
superior court judge sitting in the county in which the appellate Board whose ruling
is being appealed is located.”); Caswell Cnty. v. Hanks, 462 S.E.2d 841, 842–43
(N.C. Ct. App. 1995) (trial court reversed for not conducting de novo trial).
163
N.C. GEN. STAT. § 67-4.1(c); see, e.g., Guide to Dangerous and
Potentially Dangerous Dog Classification, ORANGE CNTY. ANIMAL SERVS.,
http://www.ocfl.net/Portals/0/Library/Animals-Pets/docs/DangerousDogs.pdf (last
visited Nov. 10, 2013) (describing the procedures in Orange County, which involve
a hearing prior to the initial determination and a hearing before the board, before
appeal to the district court).
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that has been adjudged dangerous or potentially dangerous.
Furthermore, since this kind of determination is likely to have a
contested factual record, the additional truth-finding procedures of a
superior court may improve the accuracy of the outcome.
On the other side of the balance, the consequences of the local
board decision are not severe. A dog owner incurs some costs if the
dog is labeled dangerous (e.g., for microchipping the dog and taking
a class on responsible ownership), but does not necessarily lose
ownership of the dog. 164 Furthermore, the costs of original
jurisdiction to the court system may be significant. These costs
include the time and expense of conducting a trial de novo and also
the confusion caused by an anomalous statute.165 Unlike many of the
statutes vesting original jurisdiction in the superior court, section 674.1 resulted in one appellate court decision, which overturned and
remanded a case to the superior court for failing to review the
decision of the animal control board de novo. 166 That litigation,
which required a written opinion from the appellate court and two
hearings before a superior court judge, is perhaps the “poster child”
of needlessly costly and duplicative proceedings that are avoidable
by authorizing the superior court to engage in appellate review of the
order, rather than conduct a de novo hearing.
Accordingly, these statutes should be changed, eliminating
the provision for original jurisdiction in the reviewing courts and
replacing it with appellate jurisdiction.
d.

Agency Decision Made Without an Opportunity for In-Person
Hearing

Four statutes confer original jurisdiction over decisions
initially made by the Department of Transportation (DOT) and its
Division of Motor Vehicles (DMV), in circumstances where the
aggrieved party was denied a license or permit without an
opportunity for a hearing:
164

See, e.g., Guide to Dangerous and Potentially Dangerous Dog
Classification, supra note 163 (describing the consequences of having a dog
adjudicated as “potentially dangerous” or “dangerous”).
165
N.C. GEN. STAT. § 67-4.1.
166
Caswell, 462 S.E.2d at 842–43 (trial court reversed for not conducting
de novo trial).
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x

Section 136-134.1167—appeals from denial or revocation
of an outdoor advertising permit;
x Section 136-149.1168—appeals from denial or revocation
of a permit for a junkyard located near a highway;
x Section 20-25169—appeals from a discretionary revocation
of a driver’s license; and
x Section 20-279.2 170 —appeals from the suspension or
revocation of an uninsured motorist’s license.
The DOT is exempt from the contested case requirements of
the APA,171 and thus the rationale for vesting original jurisdiction to
the superior court is presumably to ensure that the aggrieved party
eventually gets a hearing with procedural safeguards. Under the
Outdoor Advertising Control Act, for example, the Secretary has the
power to issue, deny, or revoke permits for building or maintaining
billboards along DOT-controlled roads. 172 An engineer makes an
initial determination on all permit applications; denials and
revocations can be appealed to the Secretary, who makes a final
determination based on the individual’s written application, the

167

N.C. GEN. STAT. § 136-134.1 (“The review of the decision of the
Secretary of Transportation under this Article shall be conducted by the court
without a jury and shall hear the matter de novo pursuant to the rules of evidence as
applied in the General Court of Justice.”); Powell v. N.C. Dep’t of Transp., 704
S.E.2d 547, 556 (N.C. Ct. App. 2011) (affirming that the superior court has original
jurisdiction and is “not bound by the agency’s findings and conclusions”).
168
N.C. GEN. STAT. § 136-149.1 (“The review of the decision of the
Secretary of Transportation under this Article shall be conducted by the court
without a jury and shall hear the matter de novo pursuant to the rules of evidence as
applied in the General Court of Justice.”).
169
N.C. GEN. STAT. § 20-25; see supra note 138 and accompanying text.
170
N.C. GEN. STAT. § 20-279.2(b) (“Any person aggrieved by an order or
act of the Commissioner requiring a suspension or revocation of his license under
the provisions of this Article, . . . may file a petition in the superior court of the
county in which the petitioner resides for a review . . . . At the hearing upon the
petition the judge shall sit without the intervention of a jury and shall receive such
evidence as shall be deemed by the judge to be relevant and proper. . . . The matter
shall be heard de novo . . . .”); see State v. Martin, 186 S.E.2d 647, 648 (N.C. Ct.
App. 1972) (noting that “ample” review of revocation is provided by statute).
171
N.C. GEN. STAT. § 150B-1(e)(8).
172
N.C. GEN. STAT. § 136-130.

Fall 2013

Simplifying the Standard of Review

627

engineer’s decision, and any supporting documents.173 There are no
provisions for an oral hearing at the agency level and thus a trial in
the superior court is the litigant’s first opportunity to contest the
agency’s decision in person. Similarly, there is no opportunity for a
hearing before the Commissioner of the DMV before one’s license is,
for example, revoked because of a conviction in another state,174 or
suspended under the Motor Vehicle Safety and Financial
Responsibility Act.175
These DOT statutes, which accord no agency-level hearings,
are inconsistent with the way that most licensing and permitting
decisions by state agencies are made and should be carefully
reviewed to see whether the anomaly is worth preserving. 176 A
license to conduct business or to drive generally implicates important
individual interests; the significance of these interests is reflected in
the APA’s general grant of agency-level hearings to applicants and
licensees.177 In a more typical licensing regime—for example, for
pharmacists—a person whose license is revoked or whose application
is denied can challenge the agency’s action in a contested case, which
results in a final decision. The aggrieved party then appeals the final
decision to the superior court, invoking its appellate jurisdiction.178

173

19A N.C. ADMIN. CODE 2E.0213 (2013). The Secretary has not yet
promulgated rules regarding his control of junkyards.
174
N.C. GEN. STAT. § 20-23 (“The Division may revoke the license of any
resident of this State upon receiving notice of the person’s conviction in another
state of an offense set forth in G.S. 20-26(a).”) (emphasis added).
175
See N.C. GEN. STAT. § 20-279.5(b) (“The Commissioner shall, within
60 days after the receipt of such report of a motor vehicle accident, suspend the
license of each operator and each owner of a motor vehicle in any manner involved
in such accident . . . .”) (emphasis added).
176
Compare N.C .GEN. STAT. § 20-279.5(b), with N.C. GEN. STAT. §
150B-3.
177
N.C. GEN. STAT. § 150B-3 (setting limits on an agency’s ability to
deny or revoke a license in the absence of specific statutory requirements).
178
See, e.g., N.C. GEN. STAT. § 90-85.38 (authorizing the Board of
Pharmacy to revoke or refuse to grant a license, consistent with the provisions of
150B). While the statute does not specify that the aggrieved party can appeal the
decision, the party may petition for review in the superior court. See CVS
Pharmacy, Inc. v. N.C. Bd. of Pharmacy, 591 S.E.2d 567, 569–70 (N.C. Ct. App.
2004) (noting that CVS filed a petition for review of the Board’s decisions and that
the superior court correctly applied whole record review).
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There are several reasons that counsel in favor of changing
the DOT statutes to reflect more typical state licensing practices.
First, two of the DOT statutes predate the enactment of the APA.179
The legislature should consider whether this outdated statutory
scheme—and perhaps even the DOT’s blanket exemption from the
APA—has continued validity. Second, as previously noted, licenses
generally implicate important individual interests; the consequences
of erroneous deprivation, particularly of a driver’s license, can be
severe (for example, for anyone who relies on their driver’s license
for their employment). Accordingly, the more typical licensing
scheme, which includes an appeal from the initial determination and
a hearing at the agency level,180 would provide additional procedural
protections for the aggrieved party without straining judicial
resources. Finally, because the superior courts have the inherent
authority to give appellate review to agency licensing decisions, such
a revision would be consistent with the long tradition of North
Carolina law to vest appellate, not original, jurisdiction in the courts
over the review of DOT decisions.181
Accordingly, these statutes should be revised for consistency
with other state licensing schemes, and to vest appellate, not original,
jurisdiction in the superior courts.
e.
Review Provisions in the North Carolina Business
Corporations Act and North Carolina Business Nonprofit Act
Another group of statutes that confer original jurisdiction on
the superior courts appears in the North Carolina Business
Corporations Act (BCA), the Business Nonprofit Act (BNA), and the
Filings, Names and Registered Agents Act182:
179

See supra Part III.A.1.a.
See, e.g., N.C. GEN. STAT. § 150B-3.
181
See, e.g., N.C. GEN. STAT. § 150B-1(e)(8). Appellate review of agency
licensing decisions is a well-established norm. Long before the APA was enacted,
the North Carolina courts reviewed petitions regarding certain licensing decisions
based on their “inherent authority to review the discretionary action of any
administrative agency, whenever such action affects personal or property rights,
upon a prima facie showing, by petition for a writ of certiorari, that such agency
has acted arbitrarily, capriciously, or in disregard of law.” In re Wright, 46 S.E.2d
696, 698 (N.C. 1948) (reviewing the suspension of a driver’s license).
182
See Appendix and accompanying text for language of statutes.
180
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x

Sections 55-15-32(a) and 55A-15-32(a)—appeals of a
foreign corporation or nonprofit from the Secretary of
State’s revocation of a license to do business in the state;
x Sections 55-14-23(b) and 55A-14-23(b)—appeals of a
foreign corporation or nonprofit from the Secretary of
State’s denial of an application to be reinstated; and
x Section 55D-16(a)—appeals from the Secretary of State’s
refusal to file documents submitted by a corporation or
nonprofit organization.
These statutes all provide, in similar language, “The appeal to the
superior court shall be determined by a judge of the superior court
upon such further evidence, notice and opportunity to be heard, if
any, as the court may deem appropriate under the circumstances.”183
While the statutes do not use the phrase “de novo,” and have not yet
been construed in a reported opinion, they appear to mandate original
jurisdiction because they direct the superior court to make its
determination “upon such further evidence, notice and opportunity to
be heard” as the court deems appropriate, and the power to take new
evidence is the hallmark of original jurisdiction.184 The statutes also
give the superior court power to order the Secretary to take the
requested action.185
These statutes have not yet resulted in a reported case and
thus it is unlikely that they are causing a strain on judicial resources.
They nevertheless merit review for conformity with the APA for two
reasons. First, it is not clear that de novo jurisdiction is warranted in
the circumstances addressed by the statute. On the one hand, the
Secretary makes her initial decision on a paper record, without an inperson hearing, and original jurisdiction in the superior court
provides procedural safeguards for the aggrieved party. On the other
hand, the consequences of erroneous deprivation are not severe
because the corporation or nonprofit can correct the mistakes in its
application and re-file. 186 Further, the additional procedures
183

N.C. GEN. STAT. § 55-15-32(a).
In re Dunn, 326 S.E.2d 309, 311–12 (N.C. Ct. App. 1985); N.C. GEN.
STAT. § 55-15-32(a) (emphasis added).
185
N.C. GEN. STAT. §§ 55-15-32(b), 55A-15-32(b), 55-14-23(c), 55A-1423(c), 55D-16(b).
186
See, e.g., N.C. GEN. STAT. § 55-14-05 (describing the effect of
administrative dissolution of a corporation); N.C. GEN. STAT. § 55-14-22
184

630

Journal of the National Association of Administrative Law Judiciary

33-2

available in the superior court are not likely to provide a significant
improvement in accuracy for this kind of determination: the
Secretary has very little discretion in revoking a business license,
denying reinstatement of a business license, or refusing to file
documents,187 and because the statute requires objective information
about the applicant, decisions of this kind are unlikely to involve
disputed facts. Thus the superior court’s power of mandamus (to
order the secretary to grant reinstatement, for example), in
combination with the power to remand if the Secretary’s decision is
arbitrary and capricious, is likely adequate to protect the aggrieved
party’s rights.
Second, the statutory language in the BCA and BNA is,
apparently, sui generis; it has never been construed by a court, there
is no similar language in comparable statutes from this state or
others, and, because it is anomalous, untried, and untested, it is
potentially confusing and could lead to protracted litigation.188 Even
if it is advisable for the superior courts to have original jurisdiction in
these appeals, the statute should be revised to more clearly confer
original jurisdiction.

(permitting corporation that has been administratively dissolved to apply for
reinstatement); N.C. GEN. STAT. § 55-15-31 (permitting Secretary to grant a new
certificate of authority to a corporation that has corrected all of the grounds for
revocation of its prior certificate); N.C. GEN. STAT. § 55D-15(d) (specifying that
the Secretary’s refusal to file a document does not, in most cases, affect the validity
of the document).
187
See, e.g., N.C. GEN. STAT. § 55-14-22(a)(2). The Secretary must grant
the application for reinstatement if the corporation has correctly provided its name,
its date of administrative dissolution, and stated that the grounds for dissolution
“either did not exist or have been eliminated.”
188
There is an echo of the language in a 1953 Motor Vehicles statute
conferring original jurisdiction. N.C. GEN. STAT. § 20-279.2(b) (“At the hearing
upon the petition the judge shall sit without the intervention of a jury and shall
receive such evidence as shall be deemed by the judge to be relevant and proper.”);
see supra Part III.A.1.d. The Uniform Commercial Code uses similar language in
its judicial review statute, but omits the word “evidence,” suggesting that it
contemplates appellate jurisdiction in the reviewing court. In an interview,
however, the chairman of the BCA Drafting Committee indicated that the
committee did not use existing statutory language as a model for the 1989 revisions
to the BCA. Telephone Interview with Russell M. Robinson, II, Founding Partner,
Robinson, Bradshaw & Hinson, P.A. and Author, ROBINSON ON NORTH CAROLINA
CORPORATION LAW (Permanent Edition, 2002) (July 17, 2012).
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No Revision Recommended

Two of the statutes that confer original jurisdiction in the
superior courts implicate the rights of voters or candidates for
political office. Because of the significant rights at stake in all
matters involving voting and ballot access, no change is
recommended to these statutes:
x Section 163-82.18 189 —appeals from a denial of voter
registration by the county board of election; and
x Section 163-278.26 190 —appeals from the denial of a
declaration of nomination or certificate of election by the
State Board of Elections.
County boards of election, which are exempt from the APA,
must follow statutorily mandated procedures before denying a voter
registration application.191 Section 163-82.18 specifically protects an
individual’s right to notice and a “prompt and fair” hearing before the
board and also gives subpoena power to the board.192 The superior
court reviews the county board’s denial of registration de novo.193
While an argument can be made against original jurisdiction of such
appeals, because the frustrated applicant for registration is entitled to
a hearing before the county board, the balance here tips in favor of
original jurisdiction in the superior court because of the fundamental
right at stake—the individual’s right to vote—and because the

189

N.C. GEN. STAT. § 163-82.18(c) (“Any person aggrieved by a final
decision of a county board of elections denying registration may at any time within
10 days from the date on which he receives notice of the decision appeal to the
superior court of the county in which the board is located. . . . [T]he matter shall be
heard de novo in the superior court in the manner in which other civil actions are
tried and disposed of in that court.”).
190
N.C. GEN. STAT. § 163-278.26 (“Any candidate for nomination or
election who is denied a declaration of nomination or certificate of election,
pursuant to G.S. 163-278.25, may . . . appeal to the Superior Court of Wake County
for a final determination of any questions of law or fact which may be involved in
the Board’s action” and “[o]n appeal, the cause shall be heard de novo.”).
191
See N.C. GEN. STAT. § 163-82.18(a)–(b).
192
Id. (giving the individual the right to appeal from an initial denial of
registration, requiring a de novo hearing before at least two members of the county
board, and requiring the board to issue a written order within five days of the
hearing).
193
N.C. GEN. STAT. § 163-82.18(c).
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consequences of an erroneous denial are significant (the individual
may be wrongfully denied the right to vote in an upcoming election).
There is also a good argument for the superior courts to have
original jurisdiction over denials by the State Board of Elections of a
declaration of nomination or certificate of election for a candidate for
political office, based on the candidate’s failure to file required
financial and organizational statements with the board.194 Applicants
are not entitled to a hearing before the Board prior to a final denial
and thus a de novo hearing in the superior court does not duplicate
the proceedings before the Board. Further, there is a significant
interest at stake—the individual’s interest in running for political
office 195 —and the consequences of an erroneous denial are
significant (the individual may be wrongfully prevented from running
as a candidate in an upcoming election). Accordingly, original
jurisdiction in the superior court should be preserved in these
statutes.
B.

Agency-Specific Judicial Review Statutes Conferring
Appellate Jurisdiction on the Superior Courts

Finally, there are numerous agency-specific statutes that
confer appellate jurisdiction over administrative appeals in the
superior courts.196 These statutes confer appellate jurisdiction in one
of several ways: by either explicitly referencing the APA,197 by using
194

See N.C. GEN. STAT. § 163-278.25 (providing that the Board will not
issue a declaration of nomination or certificate of election until the candidate has
filed required statements); see also N.C. GEN. STAT. § 163-278.24 (requiring the
Board to determine that statements conform to “law and to the truth” within four
months of their submission); N.C. GEN. STAT. § 163-278.9 (listing some of the
statements that must be filed with the Board of Elections).
195
The right to run for office is not clearly established as a fundamental
constitutional right. However, scholars, and some courts, have argued that it
should be established as such, given that it implicates the first amendment rights of
voters, candidates, and political parties. See, e.g., Dennis W. Arrow, The
Dimensions of the Newly Emergent, Quasi-Fundamental Right to Political
Candidacy, 6 OKLA. CITY U. L. REV. 1 (1981); James S. Jardine, Ballot Access
Rights: The Constitutional Status of the Right to Run for Office, 1974 UTAH L.
REV. 290 (1974).
196
See Appendix.
197
E.g., N.C. GEN. STAT. § 113A-123 (“Any person directly affected by
any final decision or order of the Commission under this Part may appeal such
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language that is similar to or compatible with the jurisdiction
conferred by the APA,198 or through silence—by not mentioning any
right or standard of review199—and thereby defaulting to the APA.
For the sake of consistency, these statutes should be revised to make
crystal clear that the jurisdiction conferred is appellate.
The simplest way to accomplish consistency might be to
remove all references to the appellate jurisdiction of the superior
courts in agency-specific statutes; in that event, the APA would
provide the standard of review by default.200 But short of removing
all references to appellate jurisdiction, the statutes that specifically
provide for appellate review should be revised to use language that
mimics or specifically references the APA. For example, an agencyspecific statute can confer jurisdiction with a citation to section
150B, Article 4, as in section 90–210.69: “Judicial review shall be
pursuant to Article 4 of Chapter 150B of the General Statutes.”201
There are several problems with the use of inconsistent
terminology in agency-specific review statutes. First, in the statutes
conferring original jurisdiction, it is easy to confuse the court’s
power to hear a case “de novo”—i.e., to take new evidence in the
case—with the court’s power to review an agency decision “de
novo”—i.e., to give a non-deferential review to the record. As
previously noted, to invoke the superior court’s original jurisdiction,
a statute must specifically use language that directs the superior court
to take new evidence or examine evidence anew.202 Some agencyspecific statutes invoke original jurisdiction in just that manner, by
instructing that on appeal the superior court must “take testimony and
decision or order to the superior court . . . pursuant to the provisions of Chapter
150B”); N.C. GEN. STAT. § 53C-2-6(c) (specifying that the standard of review
“shall be as provided in G.S. 150B-51(b)”).
198
E.g., N.C. GEN. STAT. § 58-63-35 (specifically stating that “findings of
the Commissioner as to the facts, if supported by substantial evidence, are
conclusive”); N.C. GEN. STAT. § 58-2-75 (specifying that the appeal shall be heard
“as a civil case upon transcript of the record for review of findings of fact and
errors of law only”); N.C. GEN. STAT. § 115C-45 (listing grounds for appeal similar
to those in the APA).
199
E.g., N.C. GEN. STAT. § 106-500 (“Any party may appeal to the
superior court from any final order of the Commissioner [of Agriculture].”).
200
N.C. GEN. STAT. § 150B-43.
201
N.C. GEN. STAT. § 90-210.69.
202
See supra Part II.A.
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examine into the facts.” 203 Other agency-specific statutes confer
original jurisdiction by requiring that the matter shall be heard de
novo204 in the superior court, or de novo “without a jury.”205 The use
of the term de novo in the statutes conferring original jurisdiction is
potentially confusing because, whereas in this context it refers to
original jurisdiction and the power to find the facts of the case as if
they had never been tried before, in other contexts (such as section
150B-51), the term describes one of the standards of review within
the superior court’s appellate jurisdiction. 206 If the legislature
continues to confer original jurisdiction over administrative appeals,
it would be preferable for the statutes that confer such jurisdiction on
the superior courts to avoid the term de novo and instead instruct the
superior court to take new testimony in the case.
Second, the variety of statutory language used to confer
appellate jurisdiction in the superior courts, and the judicial
construction of such statutes, can cause uncertainty about the
standards the court must apply. For example, under section 58-2-75,
the orders and decisions of the Commissioner of Insurance are
reviewed “by the trial judge as a civil case upon transcript of the
record for review of findings of fact and errors of law only.”207 Six
other statutes208 specify that the judicial review of agency action is
203

E.g., N.C. GEN. STAT. § 20-25 (in appeal from denial, cancellation, or
suspension of a motor vehicle license, superior court is authorized to “take
testimony and examine into the facts of the case”); N.C. GEN. STAT. § 108A-79 (in
appeal from social services agency, superior court is authorized to “take testimony
and examine into the facts of the case”).
204
E.g., N.C. GEN. STAT. § 20-28.5 (appeal from forfeiture of impounded
motor vehicle or funds).
205
E.g., N.C. GEN. STAT. § 136-134.1 (appeal from final decision of
Secretary of Transportation); N.C. GEN. STAT. § 163-82.18 (1957) (appeal from
denial of voter registration).
206
See supra Part II.B.2.
207
See N.C. GEN. STAT. § 58-2-75 (2013). Section 58-2-75 was enacted
in 1945. 1945 N.C. Sess. Laws 383.
208
N.C. GEN. STAT. § 58-19-70 (“Any person aggrieved by any order
made by the [Insurance] Commissioner pursuant to this Article may appeal in
accordance with G.S. 58-2-75.”); N.C. GEN. STAT. § 58-28-20(e) (“Any person
required to cease and desist violating G.S. 58-28-5 by an order issued after notice
and a hearing under subsection (a) or (d) of this section may seek judicial review of
that order under G.S. 58-2-75.”); N.C. GEN. STAT. § 58-40-25 (“The insurance
public protection classifications established by the [Insurance] Commissioner
issued pursuant to the provisions of this Article shall be subject to appeal as
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governed by section 58-2-75; one of those statutes even specifies that
review should be made pursuant to section 58-2-75 and that “Chapter
150B [the APA] . . . does not apply” to appeals from that section.209
Section 58-2-75 essentially provides for appellate review of the
Commissioner’s orders and, according to section 150B-43, should
control unless it prescribes an inadequate form of review.210
But the courts have held otherwise. 211 Despite finding that
the jurisdiction conferred by section 58-2-75 and the type of review it
prescribes is “virtually identical” to that in section 150B-51,212 the
Court of Appeals has held that the APA is the controlling judicial
review statute in appeals from decisions of the Insurance
Commission and that it will apply section 58-2-75 only to the extent
that it “adds to and is consistent with the judicial review function of
[section] 150B-51.”213 However, it is not evident that section 58-275 adds anything to or is in any way inconsistent with section 150B51, as it is “virtually identical” to the APA. 214 This treatment of
section 58-2-75 is unduly complicated and contradicts the mandate in
section 150B-43 that the APA controls “unless adequate procedure
for judicial review is provided by another statute, in which case the
review shall be under such other statute.”215 In other words, the APA
should control only if the judicial review provided in section 58-2-75
is inadequate.

provided in G.S. 58-2-75, et seq.”); N.C. GEN. STAT. § 58-45-50 (“All persons or
insureds aggrieved by any order or decision of the [Insurance] Commissioner may
appeal as is provided in G.S. 58-2-75.”); N.C. GEN. STAT. § 58-65-132 (“An appeal
from a final decision and order of the [Insurance] Commissioner under this section
shall be conducted pursuant to G.S. 58-2-75. Chapter 150B of the General Statutes
does not apply to the procedures of G.S. 58-65-131, this section, and G.S. 58-65133.”); N.C. GEN. STAT. § 97-196 (“Appeals of the [Industrial] Commissioner’s
orders under this section shall be governed by G.S. 58-2-75.”).
209
N.C. GEN. STAT. § 58-65-132.
210
N.C. GEN. STAT. § 150B-43 (providing that judicial review shall be
under the APA “unless adequate procedure for judicial review is provided by
another statute, in which case the review shall be under such other statute”).
211
See N.C. Reinsurance Facility v. Long, 390 S.E.2d 176, 178 (N.C. Ct.
App. 1990).
212
Id.
213
Id.
214
Id.
215
Id.
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The North Carolina Supreme Court has also indicated that it
will treat statutes enacted before and after the APA differently. 216
When an agency-specific review statute was enacted prior to the
APA and confers jurisdiction comparable to section 150B-51, the
Supreme Court has found that section 150B-51 controls; but when
the comparable agency-specific review statute was enacted after the
APA, the Court has found that the specific statute controls.217
Regarding section 58-2-75 and the statutes that refer to it, the
legislature should amend the statute to clarify whether it or section
150B-51 controls. The legislature should also amend all statutory
provisions that confer, in different language, jurisdiction that is
virtually identical to the APA. The legislature should either clarify
that the statute should be construed as being fully consistent with the
APA—and therefore provides for adequate review and controls—or
should provide that review be in accordance with Article 4 of the
APA.
Finally, the legislature should review and consider amending
all of the statutes that refer to “any competent evidence.”218 To the
extent that this standard applies to agencies that are subject to the
APA, the standard is likely superseded by the substantial evidence
test of section 150B-51. A legislative amendment will help to avoid
confusion and protracted litigation.
IV.

CONCLUSION

In its current form, Article 4 of the North Carolina APA
envisions a uniform and simple model of judicial review: by default,
all appeals from administrative decisions or orders are reviewed in
the superior court, invoking its appellate jurisdiction, under either the
de novo or whole record standard of review, depending on the type of
errors asserted by the aggrieved party.219 But there are currently too
many deviations from this norm, mostly created by agency-specific
judicial review statutes. The costs imposed by confusing or
216

See In re Appeal of McElwee, 283 S.E.2d 115, 120 (N.C. 1981).
Id. (finding that judicial review provision in section 105-345.2, enacted
six years after the enactment of the APA, is equal to that under the APA and the
controlling judicial review statute for appeals from the Property Tax Commission).
218
See supra Part II.B.3.a.
219
N.C. GEN. STAT. §§ 150B-43 to -57.
217
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unnecessarily stringent judicial review statutes burden judges,
agencies, and litigants alike.
The legislature should follow through with its goal of creating
“a uniform system of administrative rulemaking and adjudicatory
procedure for agencies” 220 by reviewing and amending the general
statutes to promote consistency with the APA. This Article has
argued that the legislature should amend all but two of the statutes
that confer original jurisdiction on the reviewing courts, conferring
appellate jurisdiction instead, and should also amend the current
array of agency-specific review statutes to use language that more
clearly and simply confers APA-style appellate jurisdiction on the
reviewing court.
Most of these changes are not radical; the legislature could
significantly improve the uniformity of judicial review statutes just
by updating obsolete statutes, modernizing archaic language, and
standardizing the statutory language used to confer jurisdiction on the
superior courts. Some of the changes—such as revising the
jurisdiction of DOT appeals from original to appellate—are more
radical and should be made only after a careful study of the entire
context of the DOT’s administrative procedure. Any changes made
should ultimately facilitate the orderly judicial review process
envisioned by the APA and desired by the North Carolina Supreme
Court.

220

N.C. GEN. STAT. § 150B-1.
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APPENDIX
Chapter of
General
Statutes221

Section

7A: Judicial
Department

7A-250(c):
Review of
decisions of
administrative
agencies

20: Motor
Vehicles

20-25: Right
of appeal to
court

221

Jurisdiction-Conferring
Language

Type of
Jurisdiction

Appeals from rulings of
county
game
commissions shall be
heard in the district court
division.
The appeal
shall be heard de novo
before a district court
judge sitting in the
county in which the
game commission whose
ruling is being appealed
is located.
Any person denied a
license or whose license
has
been
canceled,
suspended or revoked by
the Division, except
where such cancellation
is mandatory under the
provisions of this Article,
shall have a right to file a
petition within 30 days
thereafter for a hearing in
the matter in the superior
court of the county
wherein such person
shall reside, . . . and such
court or judge is hereby
vested with jurisdiction
and it shall be its or his
duty to set the matter for
hearing upon 30 days'
written notice to the
Division, and thereupon
to take testimony and
examine into the facts of
the
case,
and
to
determine whether the
petitioner is entitled to a
license or is subject to
suspension, cancellation
or revocation of license

Original

III(A)(1)
(a), (c)

Original

III(A)(1)
(a), (d)

Discussion
in Article

All references are made to the 2013 version of the North Carolina
General Statutes.
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20: Motor
Vehicles

20-279.2(b):
Commissioner
to administer
Article;
Appeal to
court

55: North
Carolina
Business
Corporation
Act

55-14-23(b):
Appeal from
denial of
reinstatement

55: North
Carolina
Business
Corporation
Act

55-15-32(a):
Appeal from
revocation

55A: North
Carolina
Nonprofit
Corporation
Act

55A-14-23(b):
Appeal from
denial of
reinstatement

55A: North
Carolina
Nonprofit
Corporation
Act

55A-15-32(a):
Appeal from
revocation

under the provisions of
this Article.
The matter shall be heard
de novo and the judge
shall enter his order
affirming the act or order
of the Commissioner, or
modifying
same,
including the amount of
bond or security to be
given by the petitioner.
The appeal to the
superior court shall be
determined by a judge of
the superior court upon
such further evidence,
notice and opportunity to
be heard, if any, as the
court
may
deem
appropriate under the
circumstances.
The appeal to the
superior court shall be
determined by a judge of
the superior court upon
such further evidence,
notice and opportunity to
be heard, if any, as the
court
may
deem
appropriate under the
circumstances.
The appeal to the
superior court shall be
determined by a judge of
the superior court upon
such further evidence,
notice, and opportunity
to be heard, if any, as the
may
deem
court
appropriate under the
circumstances.
The appeal to the
superior court shall be
determined by a judge of
the superior court upon
such further evidence,
notice, and opportunity
to be heard, if any, as the
court
may
deem
appropriate under the
circumstances.
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Original

III(A)(1)
(a), (d),
(e)

Original

III(A)(1)
(e)

Original

III(A)(1)
(e)

Original

III(A)(1)
(e)

Original

III(A)(1)
(e)
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55D: Filings,
Names, and
Registered
Agents for
Corporations,
Nonprofit
Corporations,
and
Partnerships

55D-16(a):
Appeal from
Secretary of
State’s refusal
to file
document

67: Dogs

67-4.1(c):
Definitions
and
procedures
90-14.1:
Judicial
review of
Board’s
decision
denying
issuance of a
license

90: Medicine
and Allied
Occupations

90: Medicine
and Allied
Occupations

90-14.10:
Scope of
review

90: Medicine
and Allied

90-210.94:
Right of

33-2

The appeal to the
superior court is not
governed by Chapter
150B of the General
Statutes,
the
Administrative
Procedure Act, and shall
be determined by a judge
of the superior court
upon such further notice
and opportunity to be
heard, if any, as the court
may deem appropriate
under the circumstances.
The appeal shall be heard
de novo before a superior
court judge . . . .

Original

III(A)(1)
(e)

Original

III(A)(1)
(c)

Upon appeal the case
shall be heard by the
judge without a jury,
upon the record, except
that in cases of alleged
omissions or errors in the
record, testimony may be
taken by the court. The
decision of the Board
shall be upheld unless
the substantial rights of
the applicant have been
prejudiced because the
decision of the Board is
in violation of law or is
not supported by any
evidence
admissible
under this Article, or is
arbitrary or capricious.
Upon the review of the
Board's decision taking
disciplinary action on a
license, the case shall be
heard by the judge
without a jury, upon the
record, except that in
cases
of
alleged
omissions or errors in the
record,
testimony
thereon may be taken by
the court.
Upon the revocation or
suspension of any license

Hybrid

II(B)(3)
(a)
III(A)(1)
(a), (b)

Hybrid

II(B)(3)
(a)
III(A)(1)
(a), (b)

Original

III(A)(1)
(a)
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Occupations

appeal upon
revocation or
suspension of
license (Board
of Funeral
Service)

108A: Social
Services

108A-79(k):
Appeals

or authority by the Board
of Funeral Service, under
any of the provisions of
this Article, the said
association or individual
whose
license
or
authority
has
been
revoked or suspended
shall have the right of
appeal. . . . Within 30
days after receipt of the
notice of appeal, the
Board of Funeral Service
shall file with the clerk
of the superior court of
the county in which the
appeal is to be heard the
decision of the Board of
Funeral Service. Upon
receipt of such decision,
the clerk of superior
court shall place the
matter upon the civil
issue docket of the
superior court and the
same shall be heard de
novo.
Any
applicant
or
recipient
who
is
dissatisfied with the final
decision
of
the
Department may file,
within 30 days of the
receipt of notice of such
decision, a petition for
judicial
review
in
superior court of the
county from which the
case arose. . . . The
hearing
shall
be
conducted according to
the provisions of Article
4, Chapter 150B, of the
North Carolina General
Statutes. The court shall,
on request, examine the
evidence excluded at the
hearing
under
G.S.
108A-79(e)(4) or G.S.
108A-79(i)(1) and if the
evidence was improperly
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Hybrid

III(A)(1)
(b)
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136:
Transportation

136-134.1:
Judicial
review

136:
Transportation

136-149.1:
Judicial
review

163: Elections
and Elections
Laws

163-82.18(c):
Appeal from
denial of
registration

excluded, the court shall
consider
it.
Notwithstanding
the
foregoing provisions, the
court may take testimony
and examine into the
facts of the case,
including
excluded
evidence, to determine
whether
the
final
decision is in error under
federal and State law,
and under the rules and
regulations of the Social
Services Commission or
the Department of Health
and Human Services.
The review of the
decision of the Secretary
of Transportation under
this Article shall be
conducted by the court
without a jury and shall
hear the matter de novo
pursuant to the rules of
evidence as applied in
the General Court of
Justice.
The review of the
decision of the Secretary
of Transportation under
this Article shall be
conducted by the court
without a jury and shall
hear the matter de novo
pursuant to the rules of
evidence as applied in
the general court of
justice.
Appeal
to
Superior
Court. - Any person
aggrieved by a final
decision of a county
board
of
elections
denying registration may
at any time within 10
days from the date on
which he receives notice
of the decision appeal to
the superior court of the
county in which the
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Original

III(A)(1)
(d)

Original

III(A)(1)
(d)

Original

III(A)(2)
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and Elections
Laws
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163-278.26:
Appeals from
State Board of
Elections;
early
docketing

board is located. Upon
such an appeal, the
appealing party shall be
the plaintiff and the
county board of elections
shall be the defendant,
and the matter shall be
heard de novo in the
superior court in the
manner in which other
civil actions are tried and
disposed of in that court.
Any
candidate
for
nomination or election
who
is
denied
a
declaration
of
nomination or certificate
of election, pursuant to
G.S. 163-278.25, may,
within five days after the
action of the Board under
that section, appeal to the
Superior Court of Wake
County for a final
determination of any
questions of law or fact
which may be involved
in the Board's action. . . .
It shall be placed on the
civil docket of that court
and
shall
have
precedence over all other
civil actions. . . .
On appeal, the cause
shall be heard de novo.
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Original

III(A)(2)

